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                                                               ABSTRACT 
 
This study involves a critical appraisal of the legal implications of South Africa’s 
withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the context of its international 
and regional human rights obligations. 
The dissertation also investigates the history and formation of the ICC, South Africa’s 
involvement and its role as a guardian of international and regional human rights 
obligations in Africa. 
The study reviews the circumstances leading to South Africa’s notice of withdrawal 
from the ICC, including the legal implications and international human rights 
obligations. 
This inquiry considers South Africa’s proposed withdrawal from the ICC which is 
supported by points of departure and a comprehensive literature review. 
The decision to withdraw from the ICC is considered to be a political one. However, 
this study raises questions about the executive’s withdrawal in regard to its domestic, 
regional and international human rights obligations, irrespective of whether it is a 
member of the ICC. 
The study surveys the background to South Africa’s participation in the ICC, its 
membership of the African Union and the implications of ICC membership including 
the obligations imposed on member states. 
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CHAPTER 1 Orientation to the study 
1.1 Introduction 
This study is a critical appraisal of the legal implications of South Africa’s withdrawal 
from the International Criminal Court, (ICC)1 in the context of its international and 
regional human rights obligations. 
The history, formation, jurisdiction and composition of the ICC is examined, where the 
long and contentious “road to Rome” is explored. 
South Africa’s role as a leader in African is considered vital to the ICC’s work and 
credibility on the continent.2 This particular role developed because President Nelson 
Mandela supported the movement to join the ICC. As a result, South Africa became 
an active participant in the negotiations leading to the implementation of the Rome 
Statute in 1998.3 
The influence of apartheid,4 the development of the new democratic dispensation and 
the role played by President Mandela is considered as South Africa moved towards 
ICC membership. 
South Africa’s role as an ICC member was tested with the al-Bashir affair. When 
President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan landed in South Africa in June 2015, he was sought 
by the ICC for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Two separate warrants had 
been issued for his arrest in March 2009 and July 2010.5 South Africa, as a 
participating party to the Rome Statute and having passed The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002, was obliged to arrest and detain President 
al-Bashir as soon as he set foot on South African territory. However, in contravention 
of the Rome Statute, as well as a court interdict compelling the government to take all 
necessary steps to prevent President al-Bashir from leaving the Republic of South 
                                                          
1 Dugard J, International Law: A South African Perspective 174. 
2 Wheeler T, Africa and the International Criminal Court 3. 
3 Du Plessis M, “South Africa’s International Criminal Court Act” Institute for Security Studies, Paper 172, 
November 2008. 
4 Dugard J, International Law: A South African Perspective 18-23. 
5 ICC-02/05-01/09-1 Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009. 
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Africa, he was allowed to leave the country on Monday, 15 June 2015, flying from the 
South African Air Force Waterkloof Air Base near Pretoria.6 
The al-Bashir affair has subsequently been influenced by Supreme Court of Appeal, 
(SCA) decisions7 and internal constitutional considerations in the National Assembly.8 
The motivation to give notice of withdrawal from the ICC is investigated and the legal 
implications of South Africa’s withdrawal considered in the context of its international 
and human rights obligations. South Africa’s proposed withdrawal from the ICC9 has 
implications for the protection of human rights by virtue of the contents of the Preamble 
of the Constitution. 
The Preamble clearly states that via our freely elected representatives, we must 
promote an open democratic society based on the will of the people and build a unified 
South Africa to establish its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations. 
In addition, the Bill of Rights10 enshrines the rights of all people in South Africa and 
promotes the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom. By meeting 
its constitutional obligations to respect and promote rights contained in section 7 of the 
Bill of Rights, the new democracy may be achieved. The rule of law dictates that 
everyone is subject to the Constitution,11 including the executive. Thus, the executive’s 
failure to comply with a High Court order that sought to arrest President Omar al-
Bashir, is considered a breach of the rule of law. 
The important relationships between the African countries and the ICC, including the 
African situations before the ICC are analysed. South Africa’s global reputation as a 
proponent of human rights is considered against its African Union (AU) membership 
and continental influence. An aspect that is investigated is whether South Africa’s 
global reputation as a powerful human rights proponent would have a persuasive 
influence in the rest of Africa, in the absence of ICC membership. 
                                                          
6 South African Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others 
(27740/20159[2015] ZAGPPHC 402; 2016 (1) SACR 161 (GP); 2015 (5) SA 1 (GP); [2015] 3 All SA 505 (GP); 2015 
(9) BCLR 1108 (GP) (24 June 2015) at 2. 
7 Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others v Southern African Litigation Centre and 
Others (867/15)[2016] ZASCA 17; 2016(4) BCLR 487 (SCA); [2016]2. 
8 Sect 55(2)(a) of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution. 
9 Part 13, Article 127(1) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002. 
10 Sect 7(1) of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of South Africa. 
11 Sect 8(1) of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of South Africa. 
3 
 
The dissertation is conducted against the backdrop of international and constitutional 
law, providing a greater appreciation of the functions of the ICC. In addition, the 
constitutional values that underpin South African society are carefully examined, 
considering the country’s international and human rights obligations. 
It is important to recall at this stage of this research document that the Constitutional 
Court in Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa (“Glenister II”)12 
reiterated the importance of international law to the South African constitutional order 
and interpretation of law. The Constitution, utilising sections 231-232, clearly describes 
the recognition and status of international law. The Implementation of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court Act (The ICC Act)13 was an essential human 
rights based policy document which contained significant legal implications and 
responsibility for South Africa. Any future withdrawal from the ICC would have 
significant legal implications which are further analysed in section 6.5 below. 
1.2 Methodology of this study 
This study will implement desktop research based on judicial decisions, academic 
authorities and government published data. The research may be defined as “external 
desktop research,” as data will be collected from sources external to the research 
centre, using online data information from international agencies. 
A qualitative research14 method will be implemented, using both primary and 
secondary sources of data. The reason that this particular research method is used, 
is to provide insight into listed research objectives and uncover trends in thought and 
opinion. 
Primary data will be sourced from the common law, legislation, case law, international 
law and indigenous law. Secondary data will be sourced from academic opinion, 
journal articles and foreign law. 
An important methodological tool has been the comparative assessment of the 
jurisprudence contained within the Rome Statute of the ICC regarding human rights, 
and the corresponding interpretation in the Constitution of South Africa. 
                                                          
12 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2011 (3) SA347 (CC) 
13 The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002. 
14 Sharp A, Howard K, The Management of a Student Research Project 107 
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1.3 Problem statement 
“What are the effects of South Africa’s possible withdrawal from the ICC in terms of 
international law and its regional human rights obligations?” 
This problem will be systematically investigated in chapter one and two by placing the 
development of international law and human rights law in context with the development 
of the South African Constitution. The history and development of the ICC is traced in 
chapter three followed by a discussion of the ratification and domestication of the 
Rome Statute in chapter four. South Africa’s relationship with the AU regarding its ICC 
membership is probed in chapter five followed by the developments regarding the visit 
of President Omar al Bashir to South Africa in chapter six. 
1.4 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses that have been developed are: 
1. International law is mainly directed at states and not in the promotion of the 
welfare of individuals. 
2.  Membership of the ICC cemented South Africa’s national commitment to 
human rights 
3. The ICC Act and South Africa’s continued membership of the ICC underpin the 
new constitutional values that supports South African society. 
4. The inconsistency of the South African Government’s actions regarding our 
membership of the ICC has diminished the character and credibility of our 
nation. 
5. Senior government officials fear future prosecution for human rights abuse by 
the ICC, and are keen to exit the ICC, moving behind the cover potentially 
offered by an African Criminal Court. (ACC) 
The supporting issues that this dissertation aims to prove are that human rights are a 
key consideration of the International Criminal Court, and that human rights violations 
that occurred during both World Wars and subsequent regional conflicts, contributed 
significantly towards the urgency of creating the ICC. 
In addition, the dissertation will show that the relationship between South Africa and 
the African Union contributed towards the decision not to arrest President Omar al-
Bashir when he visited South Africa in June 2015. 
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1.5 Points of departure 
The study has identified the following points of departure: 
1. To date, legal analysts and commentators have pointed to the careless and 
inefficient government officials that allowed President Omar al-Bashir to evade 
arrest in South Africa. This study suggests that the entire visit of President 
Omar al-Bashir was orchestrated. His arrival, tenure and departure was aided 
and abetted by state officials, diplomatic leaders and defence force personnel.15 
When it seemed likely that an arrest warrant would be executed for al-Bashir, 
his hasty exit was facilitated by moving his executive jet aircraft from OR Tambo 
International Airport to Waterkloof Air Force Base in Pretoria. Here his hasty 
departure was ensured within a security cordon, hours before the High Court 
ruling of his arrest.16  
2. The statement made by the South African Minister of International Relations, 
Mrs Maite Nkoana-Mashebane, regarding the reasons for South Africa’s 
withdrawal from the ICC, indicated that South Africa had found its obligations 
with regard to the peaceful resolution of conflict, are at times incompatible with 
the interpretation given by the ICC.17 This study suggests that South Africa’s 
ability to effectively resolve conflict in Africa is limited, and is using ICC 
membership as an excuse for ineffective human rights protection on the 
continent. 
3. In the context of existing ICC membership, South Africa’s role as a champion 
of human rights, and a leader on the continent is considered a vital component 
of the success of the ICC. This study suggests that South Africa has 
demonstrated, by intending to leave the ICC, that it is not the champion of 
international human rights on the African continent and has not fully considered 
the legal implications following such withdrawal. Recent events within the 
country suggest an abuse of executive power, neglect of human rights and 
disregard for parliamentary process. 
                                                          
15 This matter will be fully discussed below in Chapter 6. 
16 See note 6 above. 
17 Notification given to the United Nations by South African Minister of International Relations, Mrs Maite 
Nkoana-Mashebane, October 19, 2016. 
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1.6 Critical events that promoted the development of International human rights 
within the context of International Criminal law. 
The atrocities committed by Germany and Japan18 during the Second World War, led 
to the institution of ad hoc tribunals19 to punish perpetrators for violations of crimes 
against humanity, among others. These atrocities contributed significantly to the 
recognition of international human rights law and the introduction of international 
criminal law. 
International human rights law represents the universal recognition that basic rights 
and fundamental freedoms are inherent to all human beings.20 The international 
human rights movement was initiated when the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) on 10 December 1948.21 
The UDHR, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, its two 
Optional Protocols, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, collectively form the International Bill of Human Rights.22 
1.6.1 The Second World War and the atrocities 
The Second World War commenced on 1 September 1939 with Germany’s invasion 
of Poland.23 Any war could be categorised as an “atrocity” but the war started by Hitler 
brought on a scale of atrocity never previously experienced. Atrocities were committed 
across Western and Eastern Europe, the Axis countries and in the Pacific region. 
The atrocities of the Second World War are sadly only remembered in terms of the 
Concentration Camps, Extermination Centres and Labour Camps situated in Germany 
and Poland.24 The extermination camps of Belzac, Sobinor and Treblinka served as 
“death factories” in which the German Secret Service (SS) and police murdered nearly 
2,7 million Jews.25 
                                                          
18 Brackman AC, The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (1989) 36. 
19 Taylor T, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, Knopf Publishing Group New York (1992) 62. 
20 As adopted in section 7(1) in the Constitution of South Africa. 
21 www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ accessed 6 March 2017. 
22 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (art.1) adopted by the UN General Assembly Resolution 217A (III) of 
10 December 1948. 
23 Churchill W, The Second World War: The Gathering Storm 15. 
24 Vogelsang P, Larson B, (2002) The Difference between Concentration Camps and Extermination Camps. 12. 
25 Holocaust Encyclopaedia, Killing Centres: An Overview. United States Holocaust Museum. 
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The atrocities led to the establishment of two ad hoc international tribunals to 
investigate and punish perpetrators. 
1.6.2 Tribunals: Nuremberg and the Far East 
Following the Second World War, the victorious Allied governments established the 
first international criminal tribunals. They intended to prosecute high-level political 
officials and military authorities for war crimes and other wartime atrocities.26 The four 
major Allied powers, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America, (USA) set up the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg, 
Germany.27 
The lesser-known International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) was created 
in Tokyo, Japan, pursuant to a 1946 proclamation by the United States Army General, 
Douglas MacAuthur. He was the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in 
occupied Japan.28 
These trials constituted a new radical approach to international law, which imposed 
considerable influence on the post-war international community searching for a similar 
international court system on a permanent basis.29 
Initial plans to prosecute German political and military leaders were announced at the 
1941 St. James Declaration in London. This was attended by all the Commonwealth 
members including those from the Union of South Africa, Allied Powers and the Soviet 
Union.30 The St. James Declaration stated that its aim was the punishment, via 
channels of organised justice, those guilty of perpetrating war crimes.31 
The Nuremberg trials lasted from November 1945 until October 1946. The IMT 
prosecutors indicted 22 senior German political and military leaders. The Tribunal 
                                                          
26 Ball H, Prosecuting War Crimes and Genocide; The Twentieth Century Experience 5. 
27 Taylor T, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials Knopf Publishing Group, New York (1992) Judgement 
published at (1947) 41 AJIL 172. 
28 Brackman A C, The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (1989). 
29 Sands P, From Nuremberg to The Hague; The Failure of International Criminal Justice 84. 
30 Inter-Allied Declaration signed on 12 June 1941 at St. James Palace, London. 
31 Declaration by the United Nations, Washington, January 1 1942, developing the Atlantic Charter which was 
built on the principles dictated by the St. James Declaration of 12 June 1941. 
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found nineteen individual defendants guilty and sentenced them to punishment that 
ranged from death by hanging to fifteen years imprisonment.32 
Unlike the IMT, the IMTFE was not created by international agreement, but emerged 
from international agreements to try Japanese war criminals.33 The IMTFE had 
jurisdiction to try individuals for crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. The IMTFE also had jurisdiction over crimes that occurred over a greater 
period of time, from the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria to Japan’s surrender in 
1945.34 
Inevitably there was criticism that these tribunals were established by the victors to try 
the defeated and were a form of retribution.35 
As a result of the IMT and IMTFE tribunals, the United Nations (UN) was energised to 
adapt a resolution on 9 December 1948, calling on the International Law Commission 
(ILC) to start work on a draft statute for the establishment of the international criminal 
court.36 
It is considered that the establishment of the ICC should be regarded as a major 
development in human rights law, and that the international regulation of human rights 
is considered mainly a post Second World War phenomenon.37 
While  the development of the ICC statute had recommenced following the termination 
of the Cold War in 1989,38 the early 1990s witnessed two landmark events that 
strengthened the momentum for the development of the Court. These were the 
atrocities that occurred in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, causing a threat to 
international peace.39 The tribunals that were created by the UN Security Council were 
                                                          
32 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal under Control Council Law No. 10 Vol XV 
Procedure, Practice and Administration, Washington DC. 
33 Brackman A C, The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (1987) 23. 
34 The Potsdam Declaration. Proclamation defining terms for the Japanese Surrender issued at Potsdam, 
Germany, 26 July, 1945. 
35 Rethinking Justice? Decolonisation, Cold War and Asian War Crimes Trials after 1945. Cluster of Excellence, 
“Asia and Europe in a Global Context.” Heidelberg University, 26.10.2014-29.10.2014. 
36 Schabas W, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 3rd ed(2007) 167. 
37 Dixon M, McCorquodale R, Cases and Materials on International Law 175. 
38 Merkl P, The Rift Between America and Old Europe; The Distracted Eagle (2005). 
39 Blumenthal D, McCormack T, The Legacy of Nuremberg; Civilising Influence or Institutional Vengeance? 
(2008). 
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a response to these concerns, and seen as a necessary measure to enforce Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter.40 
1.6.3 Other tribunals 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter explicitly states that the UN Security Council must 
determine and make decisions in order to, “maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”41 This provision should be considered against further atrocities that were 
committed during the period of the international codification of human rights, which 
demonstrated the need for a permanent tribunal. 
The ILC prepared a draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal in the early 
1990s which was forwarded to the UN General Assembly for consideration.42 During 
the time that the commission was preparing the Draft Statute, deteriorating events 
compelled the creation of a court on an ad hoc basis to respond to the numerous 
atrocities that were being committed in the former Yugoslavia.43 That tribunal, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by 
the UN Security Council in 1993. Its mandate was to prosecute persons responsible 
for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the former 
Yugoslavia since 1991.44 The first prosecutor of the Tribunals from 1994 to 1996 was 
Richard Goldstone of the South African Constitutional Court.45 
In November 1994, acting on an urgent request from Rwanda, the UN Security Council 
voted to create a second ad hoc tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, (ICTR).46 The ICTR was charged with the prosecution of genocide and other 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda and 
neighbouring countries in 1994. The President of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR, 
prior to her appointment as a judge of the ICC, was Judge Navi Pillay, another 
prominent South African jurist.47 
                                                          
40 Allison G, Powers S, Realising Human Rights; Moving from Inspiration to Impact (2000) 42. 
41 United Nations Security Council Charter, Chapter VI Art. 39. 
42 Crawford J, The ILC adopts a Statute for an International Criminal Court (1995) 89 AJIL 404. 
43 Dugard J, International Law; A South African Perspective 172. 
44 UN Security Council Resolution 808 of 22 February 1993 and UN Security Council Resolution 827 of 25 May 
1993. 
45 Goldsone R, Journal of International Criminal Justice 2 (2004) 380-384. 
46 Security Council Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994. 
47 Dugard J, International Law; A South African Perspective 172. 
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The appointment of two prominent members of the South African judiciary to positions 
on the ICTY and ICTR, occurred at virtually the same time that the first democratic 
elections were held in South Africa. The prominence and recognition afforded to the 
new South African Constitution,48 the election of President Nelson Mandela and a 
comprehensive Bill of Rights,49 propelled South Africa’s legal expertise regarding 
human rights issues, onto the world stage. 
The activities of the ICTY and ICTR tribunals promoted the concept of a permanent 
international criminal court that was both practical and desirable.50  The legal principles 
developed during the operation of the ICTY and ICTR tribunals contributed to the 
debates at Rome and gradually became reflected in the Rome Statute.51   
1.7 The influence of international human rights law on South Africa 
International human rights law refers to that body of international law created to protect 
human rights at the international, regional and domestic levels.52 They are mainly 
obligations which states are bound to obey and are primarily made up of treaties, 
agreements between states and customary international law. 
Section 39 of the Bill of Rights indicates that the Constitution must always be 
considered in the interpretation of human rights law. This promotes the State’s 
responsibility to promote the rights contained in section 7(2) of the Bill of Rights, which 
reflects aspects of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948.53 
The link between Human Rights Law and International Criminal Law was developed 
following the acknowledgement that international law, up until 1945, was largely 
directed at states, and did not consider the interests of the individual, who were often 
caught up in international conflict and related criminal activities.54  
 
 
                                                          
48 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, commencement 4 February 1997. 
49 Bill of Rights, Chapter 2 of the Constitution of South Africa sections 7-39. 
50 Dugard J, International Law; A South African Perspective, 172-173. 
51 Schabas W, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2004) 12. 
52 definitions.uslegal,com/i/international-human-rights-law/ accessed 17 March 2017. 
53 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. 
54 Dugard J, International Law: A South African Perspective, 321. 
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1.7.1 The inclusion of the values of freedom, dignity and equality 
Section 12 of the Constitution combines the right to freedom and security of the person 
with regards to a right to bodily and psychological integrity.55 When a person is 
deprived of physical freedom, the Constitution56 guarantees both substantive and 
procedural protection. The two components of the right were described in S v 
Coetzee57 by O’Regan J. She indicated that the first component is concerned with the 
reasons for which the state may deprive someone of their freedom, and is known as 
the substantive component. The second is concerned with the manner whereby a 
person is deprived of their freedom, and is known as the procedural component. The 
South African Constitution recognises both aspects are important in a democracy and 
may not deprive the freedom of individuals in a manner which is procedurally unfair.58 
In Ferreira v Levin, Ackerman J, suggested a “broad and generous” interpretation of s 
11(1) of the Interim Constitution, and held that the right to freedom amounted to a 
presumption against the imposition of legal and other restrictions on conduct without 
sufficient reason.59 Writing for the majority in the Ferreira case, Chaskalson CJ 
indicated that s 11(1) of the Constitution was directly comparable to Article 5(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and to a number of similarly formulated 
provisions in other international human rights instruments.60 
In De Lange v Smuts61 Ackerman J, indicated that the cause for deprivation of freedom 
must be in accordance with the basic tenets of a legal system. This also corresponds 
with the standards of “fundamental justice” suggested 62in section 7 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
The content of both European and Canadian human rights and freedom charters is 
clearly evident in the Constitution,63 where persons are not to be deprived of freedom 
arbitrarily or without just cause. 
                                                          
55 Currie I, de Waal J, The Bill of Rights Handbook 270. 
56 Section 12(1) of the Constitution of South Africa. 
57 S v Coetzee 1997(3) SA 527 (CC) [159] quoted in De Lange v Smuts NO 1988(3) SA 785 (CC) [18]. 
58 Section 12 and 35 of the Constitution of South Africa. 
59 Ferreira v Levin NO 1996(1) SA 984 (CC) [54]. 
60 Ferreira v Levin NO 1996(1) SA984 (CC) [170]. 
61 De Lange v Smuts NO 1998(3) SA785 (CC) [57]. 
62 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 7. 
63 Section 12(1)(a) of the Constitution of South Africa. 
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The value of freedom is also included in other sections of the Bill of Rights, such as in 
Freedom of Religion (s 15), Freedom of Expression (s 18), Freedom of Movement and 
Residence (s 21) and Freedom of Trade (s 22). 
The Constitution64 indicates that everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have 
their dignity respected and protected. Chaskalson CJ,65 reflecting on the value of 
human dignity as a founding value said: 
“-The affirmation of [inherent] human dignity as a foundational value of the constitutional order 
places our legal order firmly in line with the development of constitutionalism in the aftermath 
of the Second World War.-” 
The concept of human dignity was codified in international human rights law in the UN 
Charter and became the foundation of the International Bill of Human Rights. The 
Preamble to the Constitution of South Africa, champions an open democratic society 
based on social justice and fundamental human rights. 
The influence of international covenants and judicial interpretation have influenced the 
importance of dignity contained in the Constitution of South Africa.66 Currie and De 
Waal67 believe that human dignity is not only a justiciable and enforceable right that 
must be respected and protected, but is also a value that informs the interpretation of 
possibly all the other fundamental rights. 
It could also be suggested that dignity is a group-based concept involving a collective 
concern for the well-being of others. In Makwanyane,68 Langa J, linked the respect for 
life and dignity with the African cultural concept of ubuntu, where the dominant theme 
is that the life of another person is “at least as valuable as one’s own.”69 In the same 
case, Mokgoro J,70 referred to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
where the inherent dignity of all members of the human family are derived from the 
                                                          
64 Section 10 of the Constitution of South Africa. 
65 Chaskalson A, “Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of our Constitutional Order. (2000) 16 SAJHR 
193,196. 
66 Section 39(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution of South Africa. 
67 Currie I, De Waal J, The Bill of Rights Handbook 253. 
68 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
69 Ubuntu is an ancient African word meaning humanity to others and incorporates a philosophical concept of 
the universal bond of sharing. 
70 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) [308]. 
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dignity of the individual human person. This, he said, “is not different from what the 
spirit of ubuntu embraces.” 
The values of human dignity, freedom and equality guide the interpretation of all 
human rights, as contained in section 39(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
1.7.2 The obligation of the State to fulfil rights contained in section 7(2) of the 
Bill of Rights 
The Constitution71 determines that the State must respect, protect, promote and fulfil 
the rights contained in the Bill of Rights. This section is described by de Vos72 as 
central to the transformative ethos of the Constitution. It conveys the concept that the 
state must not only refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of rights, but must also 
protect and fulfil the enjoyment of rights. It is important to note that section 7(2) not 
only applies to the duties imposed by social and economic rights, but also applies to 
all rights contained in the Bill of Rights.  
The Constitutional Court has recognised in several judgements that section 7(2) 
places both a negative and positive obligation on the state to uphold civil and political 
rights. In August v Electoral Commission and Others 73 the court recognised the 
positive duties imposed by the right to vote.74 
In Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 75 the court outlined the role 
and responsibility placed on the state as outlined in section 7(2) of the Constitution.76  
The court also stated that section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution creates a constitutional 
obligation to take international law into consideration, in order to promote unity 
between the Republic’s external obligations under international law and the ensuing 
impact on  domestic legal matters. 
The direct application of the duties imposed on the state as contained in section 7(2) 
of the Constitution, are governed by the application of section 8(1). 
                                                          
71 Section 7(2) of the Constitution of South Africa. 
72 De Vos P, et al, South African Constitutional Law in Context. 671. 
73 August and Another v Electoral commission and Others (CCT8/99) [1999] ZACC 3; 1993(3) SA 1; 1999 (4) 
BCLR 363 (1 April 1999). 
74 Section 19(30)(a) of the Constitution of South Africa. 
75 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011(3) SA 347 CC [201]. 
76 The State must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. Section 7(2) of the 
Constitution of South Africa. 
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Section 8(1) of the Constitution states that the Bill of Rights applies to all law, and 
binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of State.77 This could 
be described as direct vertical application,78 which outlines the circumstances in which 
the law and conduct of the State may be challenged as inconsistent with the Bill of 
Rights. 
1.7.3 The incorporation of international law in the Constitution 
From 1948 to 1990, South Africa was in conflict with both the international community 
and international law. During this period international law was perceived as a threat to 
the state, but is now viewed as one of the pillars of the new democracy.79  
In terms of section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution, courts must consider international law 
when interpreting the Bill of Rights. International law had a marked effect on the court’s 
interpretation in the Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School80 where 
international sources of law such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, (ICESCR) and the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
(UNHRC) were referred to and formed part of the judgment. 
The common law has been given constitutional endorsement in the Constitution.81 
Section 232 states that customary international law is law in the Republic of South 
Africa, unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. 
This section illustrates that international law is no longer subject to subordinate 
legislation.82 Courts must interpret legislation that is consistent with international law. 
1.7.4 The importance of the Makwanyane case in the harmonisation and 
explanation of international law 
It is important to understand the significance of the development and interpretation of 
section 35 and 39 of the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions respectively. This development 
is discussed with reference to the landmark case of S v Makwanyane.83  
                                                          
77 Section 239 of the Constitution of South Africa. 
78 Currie I, De Waal J, The Bill of Rights Handbook 41. 
79 1 EJIL (1997) 77-92. 
80 Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay NO 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC) [45]. 
81 S 232 of the Constitution of South Africa. 
82 Dugard J, International Law and the South African Constitution 79. 
83 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) [35]. 
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The key issue that is addressed in Makwanyane is the manner whereby the court 
explained section 35(1)84 of the 1993 Constitution. 
This case was submitted to the Court assuming that the death penalty contravened 
section 11(2) of the 1993 Constitution, among others, which extended the right of the 
individual not to be subjected to such cruel, inhumane and degrading punishment. 
Section 35(1) contained in Chapter 3 of the 1993 Constitution states: 
“-In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter, a court of law shall promote the values which 
underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom of equality and shall, where 
applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the rights entrenched in this 
Chapter, and may have regard to comparable foreign case law.-” 
Section 39(1) of the 1996 Constitution differs from the content of section 35(1) of the 
1993 Constitution with regards to the consideration of international law. Section 39(1) 
of the 1996 Constitution provides: 
“-When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum- 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom. 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law.-”  
It is important to note the use of the word “must” in the consideration of international 
law and “may” when considering foreign law. Keightley85 makes the point that section 
39(1) of the 1996 Constitution extends the interpretational role of international law 
further than was the position in the 1993 Constitution. In the 1996 Constitution, not 
only the courts, but also any other tribunal and forum are obliged to consider 
international law. 
Makwanyane dealt with the abolition of the death penalty by considering comparative 
decisions from other jurisdictions, including international human rights law. These 
included the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the European 
                                                          
84 Section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution of South Africa deals with the interpretation of provisions promoting 
the values that underlie an open democratic society based on freedom and equality regarding arrested and 
detained persons. Consideration should be given to public international law and may be given to comparable 
foreign case law. 
85 Keightley R, “Public International Law and the Final Constitution.” (1996) 12 SAJHR 404-418 at 415. 
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Commission on Human Rights and the United Nations Committee on Human Rights.86 
The decisions reached by these courts, whilst not binding in South African law, 
assisted the court in reaching its final decision. 
In terms of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution, the court in Makwanyane concluded 
that the term “international law” included both binding and non-binding sources of 
international law.87 
The Makwanyane decision was extremely important in that it provided guidance in the 
application of international law regarding constitutional interpretation in that one can 
derive assistance from public international law, but one is not bound by it.88 
The court in the Makwanyane case also recognised that both binding and non-binding 
international law created the framework for the interpretation of public international 
law.89 Whilst guidance can be found in international law, the courts should be mindful 
of the fact that the Constitution is the highest law in the Republic, and that any law, 
including international law, that is inconsistent with it, is invalid.90 
Whilst considering the impact made by Makwanyane in the context of international 
law, it is important to balance that decision based on the 1993 Constitution with that 
made in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom,91 which is based 
on the 1996 Constitution. In Grootboom, the court accepted the position regarding 
international law for the purposes of section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution. This 
included both binding and non-binding sources of international law to provide a 
framework for constitutional interpretation. However, Yacoob J, stated that while 
international law might be a guide to interpretation, “the weight to be attached to any 
particular principle or rule of international law will vary.”92 
Following this interpretation of international law, it is appropriate to investigate how 
international agreements apply in South Africa in a manner that is consistent with the 
current interpretation of international law 
                                                          
86 Du Plessis LM, “Interpretation” in Woolman S, Roux T and Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
(2nd ed 2008) 32:1-193 at 172. In S v Makwanyane 1995 (2) SA 391 (CC) [39]. 
87 S v Makwanyane 1995 (2) SA 391 (CC) at [34] and [35]. 
88 S v Makwanyane 1995 (2) SA 391 (CC) at [39]. 
89 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at [35]. 
90 S 2 of the 1996 Constitution; S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) {36-39]. 
91 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
92 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at [26]. 
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1.7.5 Section 231 of the Constitution and international agreements 
Section 231 of the 1996 Constitution provides guidance on the implementation of 
international law.93 
Dugard94 points out that the 1996 Constitution, uses the term “international 
agreement” instead of the more commonly used term, “treaty.” This has created 
uncertainty over the meaning of section 231, as there is support for the view that the 
term “international agreement” is wide enough to include both legally binding 
agreements (treaties) and non-binding, unenforceable informal agreements.95 The 
Constitutional Court in Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa the court 
stated that “international agreement” should be interpreted to mean “treaty” as defined 
in article 2 of the VCLT.96 
Section 231 (1) and (2) state: 
(1) The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the 
national executive. 
(2) An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by 
resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, unless 
it is an agreement referred to in subsection (3).   
 
In Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa,97  the Constitutional Court 
stated that the national executive is assigned “the authority to negotiate and sign” 98 
international treaties, whereas the ratification falls within the province of parliament. It 
is important to differentiate between the official external ratification and the subsequent 
internal approval process. The key issue that must be identified, and highlighted in S 
v Harksen,99 is that the agreement between states is in writing and that the State 
parties intend to be governed by international law.  
This process was followed on 17 July 1998, when the South African executive signed 
and ratified the Rome Statute, becoming the 23rd State Party. In order to incorporate 
                                                          
93 Sections 231-233 of the Constitution of South Africa. 
94 Dugard J, International Law. A South African Perspective 60. 
95 Olivier M, Informal international agreements under the 1996 Constitution (1997) 22 SAYIL 63. 
96 Harksen v The President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT 41/99) [2000] ZACC 29; 2000(2) SA 
825 (CC); 2000(1) SACR 300 (5) BCLR 474 (30 March 2000) [24]. 
97 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa (2011) ZACC 6, 2011(3) SA 347 (CC). 
98 Section 2 of the 1996 Constitution; S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) [85]. 
99 S v Harksen 2000 (1) SA 1185 (C) at [85].  
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the obligations of the Rome Statute, South Africa’s parliament approved the 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 100 (ICC 
Act). A key provision in the ICC Act extends jurisdiction to include a person, who “after 
the commission of the crime, is present in the territory of the Republic,” which then 
provides South African courts with universal jurisdiction.101 
Section 231(3) contains provisions directly related to the internal constitutional 
requirements of how South Africa implements ratification or accession.102 This serves 
to promote parliamentary participation in the decision making process when 
considering rights and obligations at the international level. The very nature of 
parliamentary participation suggests the inclusion of public comment and opinion. This 
complies with the Bill of Rights, section 15(1) freedom of opinion and section 16(1)(b) 
freedom to receive or impart information or ideas. These constitutional provisions are 
key to parliamentary participation in the domestication of international obligations. 
Section 231(3) provides the basis of a crucial subsequent discussion in this 
dissertation, where the possible legal implications of rescinding of the Implementation 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 is investigated. 
In Azapo v President of the Republic of South Africa103 it was also confirmed that 
“international conventions and treaties do not become part of the municipal law in our 
country, and are not enforceable at the instance of private individuals in our courts, 
until, and unless, they are incorporated into municipal law by legislative enactment.”  
Section 231(4) makes it clear that the Constitution does not compel Parliament to 
introduce approved and ratified international agreements into domestic law. 
Parliament must determine appropriate domestic measures to comply with 
international obligations.104 All will depend on the intention of the parties which must 
                                                          
100 The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002. (Implemented 
in terms of Sect 231(4) of the Constitution of South Africa) 
101 Section 4(3)(c) of the ICC Act. 
102 The Constitution does not give any indication of which agreements would qualify as technical, 
administrative or executive as contained in section 231(3) of the Constitution. The internal practice that has 
developed within the Office of the Chief State Legal Adviser is to consider as “technical” those agreements that 
do not have major political significance and do not impact domestic law. The Implementation of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 certainly impacts domestic law and section 231(3) 
would not be directly applicable for the purposes of this dissertation 
103 Azapo v President of the Republic of South Africa [1996] ZACC 16, 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) at [688]. 
104 Article 12 of the Vienna Convention; S v Eliasov 1967(4) SA583(A), discussed by J Dugard in “The Treaty 
making Process” (1968) 85 SALJ 1. 
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be ascertained from the consideration of surrounding circumstances at the conclusion 
of an international agreement. 
In Glenister, it was pointed out that “endemic corruption threatens the injunction that 
government must be accountable, responsive and open.”105 In addition article 18 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)106 confers a duty on the South 
African government to act in good faith domestically and to eliminate arbitrary acts 
which would defeat the purpose of an international treaty. 
Having set out the background relating to the importance of international human rights 
law in South Africa, the next section explains South Africa’s relationship with the 
International Criminal Court. 
1.8 South Africa and the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
South Africa has had a long and distinguished association with the development and 
formation of the ICC. The role played by South Africa is discussed below in section 
3.1 but it is essential to recall why the Republic pursued membership of this 
international body. 
The reasons are best embodied by the words of President Nelson Mandela in 1993: 
“-South Africa’s future foreign relations will be based on our belief that human rights should 
be the core concern of international relations, and we are ready to play a role in fostering 
peace and prosperity in the world we share with the community of nations. The time has 
come for South Africa to take up its rightful place in the community of nations.” 
“South Africa views the ICC not in isolation, but as an important element in a new system 
of international law and governance. The importance of the ICC needs to be seen in   
context with the need for the fundamental reform of the system of global governance.” 
“Indeed, Africa and the whole world need the ICC yesterday, today and forever.-”107 
In the preamble to the ICC Act, South Africa made the solemn commitment to bring to 
justice persons who commit crimes against humanity and war crimes, in line with its 
international obligations. By doing so South Africa signalled to the world its intention 
                                                          
105 Glenister (see note 84) at [176]. 
106 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted on 22 May 1969 and entered into force on 27 
January 1980. 
107 Bizos G, “Why SA must not withdraw from the ICC”http://mg.co.za/article/2015-10-16-why-sa-must-not-
withdraw-from-the-icc  Accessed 16 October 2016. 
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to help drive a system of international criminal justice based more on humanity108 and 
its duty to its citizens. 
1.8.1 The part played by South Africa in the formation of the ICC 
Despite the fact that the direct involvement of South Africa in the formation of the ICC 
occurred during the latter stages of the 20th century, some significant events guided 
our contribution.  
Representatives from the Union of South Africa contributed to the establishment of the 
League of Nations, established after the First World War on 28 April 1919.109 
The Union of South Africa contributed to the formation of the St. James Declaration in 
London during January 1942, providing for the punishment, through international 
channels of organised justice, those guilty of war crimes.110 
South Africa contributed to the formation of the United Nations in October 1945, 
composing the Preamble to the United Nations Charter. This reflected the intention “to 
establish conditions under which justice and respect for obligations arising from 
treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.”111 
The UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993,112 which was formed to prosecute persons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia. This was followed in November 1994,113 by the second ad hoc 
tribunal (ICTR) to prosecute serious violations of international humanitarian law in 
Rwanda. The first prosecutor of the Tribunals, from 1994 to 1996, was Richard 
Goldstone from the South African Constitutional Court. The President of the Appeals 
Chamber for the Rwanda Tribunal was another South African, Judge Navenethem 
(Navi) Pillay.114 
                                                          
108 Sands P, “Lawless World: The Cultures of International Law” (2006) 41 Texas International Law Journal 387. 
109 Potgieter D J, et al. (eds) (1970) Standard Encyclopaedia of Southern Africa 560. 
110 Punishment of War Crimes. The inter-Allied Declaration signed at St James Palace, London, 13 January 1942. 
(Issued by the Inter-Allied Information Committee, London, 1942) pp 2-4. 
111 Schlesinger S, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations: A Story of Superpowers, Secret Agents, 
Wartime Allies and Enemies, and their Quest for a Peaceful World pp236-237. 
112 Security Council Resolution 808 of 22 February 1993. 
113 Security Council Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994. 
114 Dugard J, International Law: A South African Perspective, 172. 
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1.8.2 Membership of the ICC cements South Africa’s national commitment to 
human rights 
Before 1994, there was little that South African courts could, or would do, about 
international human rights instruments. 
South Africa was party to only one instrument containing human rights clauses, the 
Charter of the United Nations, which was not incorporated into municipal law.115 
Consequently no direct effect could be given to articles 55 and 56 of the Charter. In S 
v Werner,116 the Appellate Division failed to take account international human rights 
norms. 
Since 1994, South Africa is party to major human rights instruments,117 including the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. In addition the 1996 Constitution 
requires courts to consider international human rights instruments in their application 
of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution.118  
The Constitutional Court explained the inter-relationship between South Africa’s 
obligations under international law and its domestic law in National Commissioner of 
Police v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre.119 Torture is criminalised in 
South Africa through the enactment of the Torture Act120 and operation of sections 232 
and 233 of the Constitution, providing the application of international law and the ICC 
Act.    
The Implementation of the ICC Act121 in August 2002 cemented South Africa’s 
commitment to human rights. Prior to the passing of this Act, South Africa had no 
domestic legislation relating to war crimes or crimes against humanity, and no 
domestic prosecutions of recognised international crimes had occurred. The ICC Act 
ensures that South Africa is aligned with the Rome Statute and builds on the concept 
of complementarity whereby state parties prosecute individuals within their national 
                                                          
115 Dugard J, International Law: A South African Perspective 346. 
116 S v Werner 1981 (1) SA 187 (A). 
117 For example The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 
118 Section 39(1) of the Constitution of South Africa. 
119 National commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre 
and Another (CCT 02/14)[2014]ZACC 30; 2015(1) SA 315 (CC) [39]. 
120 Prevention and Combatting of Torture of Persons Act 13 of 2013. 
121 See note 98 above. 
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jurisdiction for crimes the ICC would otherwise hold jurisdiction. The ICC Act enables 
South African domestic law to act against crimes against humanity and promotes the 
sanctity of international human rights.122 Any repeal of the ICC Act would severely 
degrade this capacity. 
Since 1994 South Africa has become an integral and accepted member of the 
community of nations. In the following sections key aspects of the Rome Statute are 
investigated. 
1.9 Legal-historic development leading to the formation of the Rome Statute 
The framework of the literature review is based on a logical sequence of historical 
events preceding the formation of the Rome Statute of the ICC. South Africa’s 
involvement with the implementation of the Rome Statute and the resulting 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act123 are 
studied. The subsequent interpretation of the Act and the influence of the AU are also 
considered. 
There are examples of international trials during the Middle-Ages,124 but only at the 
Paris Peace Conference of 1919 did International Criminal Justice become 
recognised.125 All efforts to present the German Emperor before an international 
tribunal126 were unsuccessful, yet the concept had been promoted onto the 
international arena. Following the Second World War and the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
trials,127 the International Law Commission (ILC) made preparations for a permanent 
court related to the Genocide Convention of 1948.128 This Convention, defined in legal 
terms, the crime of genocide, as conceived by Lemkin.129 
                                                          
122 Du Plessis M, “Bringing the International Criminal Court home-the implementation of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court Act 2002,” SACJ (2003) 16. 
123 The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002. 
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In 1954 as the Cold War130 raged on, the UN General Assembly suspended the 
development of a permanent court, which was not seriously revived until the 
establishment of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.131 This 
led to the development of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court132 on 
17 July 1998, entering into force on 1 July 2002. 
The Preamble to the Rome Statute133 states that it is the duty of every state to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes. This provides that 
the jurisdiction of the court shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction.134 
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,135 a Preamble to a treaty 
is deemed to be part of its context. Schiff136 has described the Preamble to the Rome 
Statute as, “capturing the idealism of the ICC project and mirroring the tensions 
between a universal image of humanity and a global society riven by national 
loyalties.” 
In 1993 the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal in the 
former Yugoslavia, (ICTY)137 mandated to prosecute persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed within Yugoslavian territory.138  
In 2009 the ICTY reported that it had concluded proceedings against 120 accused out 
of the 161 indicted, and expected to conclude its proceedings in 2012.139 
In another UN Security Council appointed tribunal, Judge Pillay,140 also a South 
African, was appointed President of the Appeals Chamber for the Rwanda Tribunal 
(ICTR), prior to her appointment as a judge of the ICC. Schabas141 has indicated that 
the findings of these Tribunals contributed to the debates at Rome and eventually were 
reflected in the Rome Statute. He added, “the development and growth of international 
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courts and tribunals in recent times is the inexorable consequence of the progressive 
development of international law.”142 
Du Plessis143 noted that on 17 July 1998 South Africa signed and ratified the Rome 
Statute, becoming the 23rd State Party. In order to domesticate the obligations in the 
Rome Statute, the South African Parliament drafted the Implementation of the Rome 
Statute of the International Court Act,144 (ICC Act) which became law on 16 August 
2002. 
Katz believes that there are two main approaches to the relationship between 
international law in the form of treaties and international obligations incurred in respect 
of such treaties.145 The first approach, the monist school, maintains that international 
law and municipal law are to be regarded as manifestations of a single conception of 
law. Monists argue that municipal courts are obliged to apply rules of international law 
directly. There is no need for any act of transformation of the provisions of the 
international agreement by the legislature into national or municipal law. Dubay146 
believes that under a monist model, international law serves not merely as a legal 
framework to guide state-to-state international relations, but as a source of law 
integrated into domestic law. This builds on Kelsen’s monist theory147 that was 
intended to promote international peace by creating binding obligations enforceable 
against state actors in formal international justice institutions. This approach should 
be considered with the provisions contained in the South African Constitution,148 
where, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum must consider 
international law. De Vos149 believes that the work of human rights treaty-monitoring 
bodies have been influential in shaping the socio-economic rights considerations in 
the South African Constitution.  
In the second approach, the dualist school, view international law and municipal law 
as completely different systems of law. As a result, domestic courts may only apply 
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international law, specifically treaties, if those treaties have been transferred into 
municipal law by legislation. In Pan American World Airways,150 Steyn CJ stated, “in 
this country the conclusion of a treaty is an executive and not a legislative act. As a 
general rule, the provisions of an international instrument so concluded, are not 
embedded in our municipal law except by legislative process.” It can therefore be 
reasonably concluded that South Africa is a dualist state, in that once it had formally 
ratified the Rome Statute, was required to enact legislation bringing its provisions 
within our municipal law.151 Having passed the ICC Act, the entire content of the Rome 
Statute has been attached to the Act as an Annexure and included in definitions of 
international crimes in Schedule 1. It would appear prima facie that the essential 
elements of the Rome Statute have been incorporated into South African law.  
Katz152 believes that states incorporating the dualist approach and including the Rome 
Statute into municipal law, should guard against technical defects in the surrender and 
extradition of suspects to international authorities. He believes that the scheme of 
arrest and surrender to the ICC as provided in the South African legislation to give 
effect to the Rome Statute, is somewhat defective. 
Dugard153 points out that Section 4(1) of the ICC Act creates jurisdiction for a South 
African court over ICC related crimes. Section 4(3)(c) of the ICC Act goes further and 
provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction. In terms of this provision, the jurisdiction of a 
South African court will be triggered when a person commits an ICC defined crime 
outside South African territory, and that person, after commission of that crime, is 
present in the Republic. This particular section refers to individuals who commit a core 
crime and do not have a close and substantial connection with South Africa at the time 
of the offence.154 The jurisdiction is grounded on the concept of universal jurisdiction 
on the basis that these persons are the common enemy of mankind.155 
On 31 March 2005, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1593, referring the 
prosecution of those allegedly responsible for atrocities committed in the Darfur region 
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in Sudan to the ICC. On 4 March 2009, Pre-Trial Chamber 1 issued a warrant of arrest 
against the Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir for his alleged responsibility under 
Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute for crimes against humanity and war crimes 
alleged by the prosecution.156 This was the first time that a sitting president has been 
investigated for international crimes before the ICC.157 Mills158 argues that the UN 
Security Council’s referral power has placed it at odds with the AU, and has facilitated 
tensions between the AU and the ICC. Article 27(1) of the Rome Statute provides that 
functional immunity does not apply to any individual before the ICC, making specific 
reference to heads of state and government.159 Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute 
provides that the traditional doctrine of personal immunity for sitting state officials does 
not apply. Since Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute, it is questioned whether a 
head of state immunity would apply to President al-Bashir? This has led to a debate 
over the correct interpretation between article 27 and article 98 of the Rome Statute. 
Article 98 provides that a state is no obliged to hand over an individual to the ICC, if in 
doing so, would be “inconsistent with its obligations under international law with 
respect to the state or diplomatic immunity of a person.” Dugard160 indicates that two 
schools of thought have emerged regarding the immunity of the head of state of a non-
party state. The first school believes that there is strong academic support for the view 
that all states are bound by the UN Charter.161 This includes non-member parties to 
the Rome Statute who would be bound by a UN Security Council resolution to accept 
the jurisdiction of the ICC. The second school believes that article 27 amounts to a 
waiver of the general immunity provided under international law for heads of state, as 
provided in article 98 of the Rome Statute. Using this school of thought, considering 
President al-Bashir is the head of a non-party state, would be immune under article 98 
of the Rome Statute.162 
South Africa’s commitment to the provisions of the Rome Statute and the ICC Act have 
been tested in response to the UN Security Council’s decision to refer the al-Bashir 
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matter to the ICC. The 13th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union 
decided that AU Member States should not cooperate with the ICC regarding 
provisions of Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC.163 This Declaration effectively 
provided that AU member states would not cooperate with the arrest warrant issued 
for President al-Bashir. The Sudan referral has been the subject of considerable 
debate which has highlighted several contentious issues in international law.164 
Eventually the South African government confirmed that it was committed to the arrest 
of President al-Bashir in accordance with its international and domestic legal 
obligations.165  
The interpretation of the South African Constitution166 which states that when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, courts, tribunals and forums must consider international 
law, could also be interpreted using the approval provided by the Constitutional Court 
in the Makwanyane167 case. Here it was held that when the Constitutional Court is 
required to resolve an issue, it must examine the relevant provisions of the Constitution 
in context. Relevant public international law that impacts the situation must be 
considered, including the language used, after which a balance must be found Currie 
and de Waal168 believe that many Constitutional Court decisions refer to the legal 
provisions in internationally recognised open and democratic societies based on 
freedom and equity. 
The Rome Statute by its very nature can be classified as an international agreement. 
It is appropriate in terms of this study to investigate the term, “international agreement” 
in relation to the Constitution and leading court cases in the Republic. In addition the 
nature of international agreements and the intended recipients are visited in one of the 
hypotheses of this dissertation, where the nature of international law is investigated in 
terms of human rights and its impact on society. 
The 1983 South African Constitution referred to “international agreements, treaties 
and conventions,”169 whilst both the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions refer only to an 
                                                          
163 The 13th Ordinary Session of the African Union (AU) held from 1 to 3 July 2009, Sirte, Libya.  
164 Dugard J, International Law: A South African Perspective, 197. 
165 Du Plessis M, SAJCJ 1. 
166 Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution of South Africa. 
167 See note 81 above. 
168 Currie I, de Waal J, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 148. 
169 Section 8(3)(e) of Act 110 of 1983. 
28 
 
“international agreement” in their respective section 231s. Neither Constitution defined 
the term “international Agreement,” but it was understood that the definition based on 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties would be followed. This describes an 
international agreement as a written agreement between states governed by 
international law.170 
As briefly discussed above, Section 231 of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa 
states: 
1. “-The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the 
national executive. 
2. An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by 
resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, unless it 
is an agreement referred to in subsection (3). 
3. An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an 
agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, entered into by the 
national executive, binds the Republic without approval by the National Assembly and the 
National Council of Provinces, but must be tabled in the Assembly and the Council within 
a reasonable time. 
4. Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by 
national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been 
approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution 
or an Act of Parliament. 
5. The Republic is bound by international agreements which were binding on the Republic 
when the Constitution took effect.-” 
South African courts first entered the debate on clarifying the meaning of the term, 
“international agreement” within the bounds of section 231 in the Harksen cases.171 
The judgement of the Cape High Court172 followed by a Constitutional Court 
decision173 provide practical relevance and constitutional guidance in the interpretation 
of section 231. 
The requirement lying at the heart of a binding international agreement is the intention 
of the parties to create reciprocal rights and obligations. The Cape High Court stated 
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that “it is this very intention and consent that distinguishes treaties from informal or ad 
hoc arrangements or agreements.”174 By excluding extradition in this case from the 
scope of section 231, the court indirectly supported the understanding that the term 
“international agreement” as used in section 231, applies only to legally binding 
agreements creating enforceable rights and duties.175  
The Constitutional Court supported the Cape High Court decision regarding the 
interpretation of international agreements. In addition the Constitutional Court 
indicated that the meaning of the term “international agreement” as used by section 
231 of the Constitution, should be given a narrow interpretation to coincide with the 
term “treaty” as it is used in the Vienna Convention.176  The 1996 Constitution is 
premised on the Vienna Convention,177 which allows final consent to be bound by a 
treaty to be given by ratification, accession or signature.178   
1.10 The relationship between the African Union (AU) and the ICC 
The relationship between the African Union (AU) and the ICC is often termed “the 
battle for the soul of international law.”179 Following the indictment of President Omar 
al-Bashir, the AU, at the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government summit 
meeting, adopted a decision that African states would not cooperate with the ICC in 
the execution of the arrest warrant issued against al-Bashir.180 This decision placed 
African states party to the Rome Statute in a difficult position regarding their 
obligations to the AU and their obligations as states party to the Rome Statute. The 
decision also raises questions about the reality of a new value-based international law, 
centred on the protection of humanity and human rights and whether such a new 
international law can escape accusations of neo-imperialism.181 This new value-based 
concept of international law predicated on the respect for human rights should be the 
common goal of all nations. Yet, this vision continues to be questioned in Africa as 
                                                          
174 Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 1 SA 1185 (CPD) [52]. 
175 See Olivier ME, “Informal international agreements under the 1996 Constitution” (1997) 22 SAYIL [65]. 
176 Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 2 SA 825 (CC) [23]. 
177 The Vienna Convention on the law of treaties. Vienna 23 May 1969. 
178 Dugard J, International Law: A South African Perspective, 416. 
179 Tladi D, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court: The battle for the soul of international 
law.” (2009) 34 SAYIL [57]. 
180 AU Summit Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), Assembly/AU/Dec245(XIII), July 2009. 
181 Koskenniemi M, “International law in Europe: Between tradition and renewal” (2005) 16 European Journal 
of International Law 113 at 123. 
30 
 
imperialistic, colonialist and even racist. It would appear that the ICC is seen as a 
Western imperial master, exercising imperial power over Africans, and using the court 
to further demean the past victims of colonialism. It would appear that an underlying 
reason for the African rejection of the ICC, is the belief that African leaders ought not 
to be tried under non-African legal systems.182 This raises the question of why the 
African states were so keen on the formation of the ICC and significantly contributed 
to the formation of the Rome Statute. It is also important to remember that the ICC will 
only exercise jurisdiction where states having jurisdiction over the crimes are “unable 
or unwilling genuinely to carry out” the prosecution.183 
The decision by the AU not to cooperate with the ICC regarding the al-Bashir affair, 
neglects the concern for the well-being of vulnerable members of society in Africa. The 
ICC was formed with values and consideration of human rights central to humanity, 
regardless of geography. Any argument developed by the AU to resist cooperation 
with the ICC, negates the tireless effort directed at the formation of the ICC by Africans 
themselves and detracts from constitutions dedicated to the protection of human 
rights. 
1.11 The significance of this study 
South Africa’s initial commitment to the ICC and contribution to its founding document, 
the Rome Statute, has been significant. The country’s role as a leading nation in Africa 
and its relationship with the AU, make it an important link between African countries, 
the ICC and other western nations. The al-Bashir affair and the subsequent notice to 
withdraw from the ICC has generated considerable debate within South Africa, 
including several High Court decisions. This study is extremely important to carefully 
investigate the history and formation of the ICC, South Africa’s role and the possible 
impact a withdrawal from the ICC would have on African affairs. South Africa’s role as 
the bastion of human rights in Africa is under threat with the possible withdrawal from 
the ICC, including its commitment to section 7 of the Bill of Rights contained in the 
Constitution.184 
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The study is important as it clarifies the separation of powers regarding the Republic’s 
international obligations and illustrates the independence of the country’s courts which 
promotes respect for the rule of law. 
The ICC functions within an imperfect framework. Leading nations, such as South 
Africa and its parliament should identify shortfalls in the court, and using its influence 
with the African Union, strive for improvements from within the system.  This study is 
vital to promote a greater understanding of the ICC, its members and the promotion of 
human rights. 
The possible withdrawal by South Africa from the ICC has been cancelled, but it is 
vitally important to discuss the implications of such a withdrawal in terms of the 
consideration of international human rights and future legal implications. A future 
application to withdraw from the ICC may be made by successive South African 
governments, so this dissertation seeks to provide the groundwork and rationale to its 
ICC membership. The historical connection between South Africa and the authors of 
the Rome Statute cannot be relegated to the realms of the past. Cicero185 once stated, 
“to be ignorant of what occurred before you were born is to remain perpetually a child. 
For what is the worth of a human life unless it is woven into the life of our ancestors 
by the records of history?” South Africa needs to weave the history of our past into the 
tapestry of our future, and strengthen our respect for international human rights and 
the welfare of our nation. 
Following this analysis of international human rights law and its influence on human 
rights law within South Africa, this study will now progress towards investigating the 
incorporation of international human rights law into the South African Constitution. This 
will be completed against the background of the legal-historic analysis leading to the 
formation of the Rome Statute and South Africa’s progressive involvement in the 
formation of the International Criminal Court, including the ICC Act186 supported by 
domestic case law. 
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CHAPTER 2. The place of international human rights law within South African 
domestic law 
2.1 Introduction 
International human rights law has been incorporated into the Constitution of South 
Africa,187 which has been supported by the South African courts in various 
judgements.188 These judgements will now be discussed including reference to 
international human rights instruments. The background of international human rights, 
their application into South African domestic law, is a vital component of this study, 
which investigates the implications of a possible withdrawal from the ICC and is 
debated in our courts. 
2.2 International human rights law 
One of the principal aims of international law is the protection of the human rights of 
the individual against infringement by his or her government.189  
The League of Nations period witnessed three important developments in the 
protection of international human rights. The mandates system that was established 
in 1919 promoted the welfare of “peoples not yet capable to stand alone against the 
strenuous conditions of the modern world.”190 Specific mention is made in article 22 of 
the Covenant of the League of Nations191 to Central Africa, where the maintenance of 
public order and promotion of equal opportunities, should be the responsibility of the 
Mandatory. The International Labour Organisation, (ILO) was also created in 1919 to 
improve the working conditions of employees, ensuring an enhanced social 
environment.192 The minority treaties were also introduced, designed to safeguard the 
rights of ethnic and religious minorities in the Balkans and Eastern Europe.193 
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In spite of these features of international law aimed at promoting the welfare of 
individuals, minorities and undeveloped peoples, international law was largely directed 
at states.194 This failure resulted in states failing to intervene in Germany before 1939, 
despite awareness of the atrocities committed by the Nazis against their own 
nationals. 
The Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations195 (the Charter) reaffirmed “faith in 
fundamental rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal 
rights of men and women.” The South African Prime Minister at the time, General 
Smuts, contributed significantly in the drafting of the Preamble.196 Chapter XIV of the 
Charter is focussed on the proposed International Courts of Justice. Article 94(1) of 
the Charter provides that each member of the United Nations undertakes to comply 
with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is party. 
This is an interesting provision to consider regarding the position of modern day 
Sudan, in terms of its current membership of the UN and not the ICC. 
Article 1(3) of the Charter states: 
“-To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, 
social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex or 
religion.-” 
These provisions are clearly evident in the current South African Constitution, 
contained within the Preamble and Bill of Rights197 and discussed below in paragraph 
2.3 
These weaknesses in the legal status of human rights articles contained within the 
Charter were exploited by South Africa. It actively sought to exclude debate and 
subsequent legal action by the UN198 on its racial policies during the apartheid era. 
South Africa’s racial policies featured regularly on the agenda of the UN General 
Assembly from 1946 until 1994.199 The UN General Assembly was of the opinion that 
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South Africa’s racial policies constituted a real threat to international peace and a 
blatant violation of the recognised principles of human rights.200 South Africa 
countered these resolutions on the ground that article 2(7) took precedence over the 
human rights clauses in the Charter.201  The policy of apartheid forced UN member 
states to choose between the supremacy of domestic jurisdiction and human rights. 
They chose human rights, and as a result, moved international law into a new era. 
In 1946, the Economic and Social Council of the UN, (ECOSOC) established a 
Commission on Human Rights. Its task was to draft an International Bill of Rights, 
comprising a declaration and a multilateral treaty. The first step in this process was 
the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was approved by the 
UN General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948.202 It was interesting to note that 
48 states voted in favour of the Declaration, but South Africa, now under a new 
National Party government, abstained from voting. The other states that abstained 
from voting included Poland, Czechoslovakia, Saudi Arabia, the USSR and 
Yugoslavia. In future years, history would show that many of these countries were 
involved in serious human rights violations that resulted in either international or 
internal conflict. 
Prior to 1994 South Africa was party to only one instrument containing human rights 
clauses, the Charter of the United Nations.203 South African constitutional history 
traced the British legal system requiring the legislative transformation of treaty 
obligations. Customary law at the time could be directly assimilated into the common 
law. Because this Charter had not been incorporated into municipal law, no effect 
could be given to articles 55 and 56 of the Charter. Article 55(c) of the Charter states 
“universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.” 
Article 56 of the Charter states that all UN members would pledge to take joint and 
separate action in cooperation with the UN for the achievement of the purposes as set 
forth in Article 55. Attempts to persuade the courts to take these clauses into account 
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as a guide to statutory interpretation fell on deaf ears.204 In S v Werner,205 the Appellate 
Division failed to take account of international human rights norms. Similarly, in S v 
Khanyile,206 Didcott J, invoked the European Convention on Human Rights, to which 
South Africa was not a party in the course of formulating a right to counsel rule.207 This 
progressive step was rejected by fellow judges and subsequently ignored by the 
Appellate Division.208 
This situation has radically changed since 1994. South Africa is now party to several 
major human rights instruments.209 This includes the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights.210 The Bill of Rights, contained in chapter 2 of the South African 
Constitution, had been inspired by these international human rights conventions, and 
relies heavily on their structure and content. Had there been no reference to 
international law in the Bill of Rights, South African courts would have been obliged to 
refer to international and foreign courts for guidance. The courts of Canada,211 
Zimbabwe212 and Namibia213 whose Bills of Rights contain no express direction to 
apply international law, have not hesitated to draw on international human rights 
treaties to assist them in interpreting their Bills of Rights.214 
It could be suggested that the South African Constitution reflects the global human 
rights struggle in that it contains many references to international human rights 
instruments.215 This recognition of global human rights suggests a hierarchical 
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approach to rights, where one considers all rights as integral to the pursuance of 
dignity and equity.216  
2.3 The incorporation of international human rights in the South African 
Constitution. 
The interim Constitution217 adopted a new approach to international human rights law. 
Section 35(1) stated that: 
“-In interpreting the provisions of [the Bill of Rights] a court of law shall promote the values 
which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and shall, 
where applicable have regard to public international law applicable to the protection of the 
rights entrenched in this Chapter, and may have regard to comparable foreign case law.-” 
This section of the interim Constitution contains values stated in the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, (UDHR).This includes the recognition of the dignity of 
the human family which forms the basis of freedom, justice and peace throughout the 
world.218 Similarly article 3 of the UDHR refers to the rights to life, liberty and security 
of persons, article 6 providing for equality before the law and article 7 against 
discrimination in any form. 
The content, intent and language contained in the final Constitution219 builds on the 
provisions of the UDHR and interim Constitution. Section 39(1) now reads: 
“-When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum- 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law.-” 
 
It is clear that the Bill of Rights, in this particular case section 39(1), relies heavily on 
the language and structure of universal human rights instruments listed above.220 This 
provision, together with section 233 of the Constitution, ensures that the courts will be 
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guided by international norms and the interpretation of international courts.221 Section 
233 provides: 
“-When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of 
the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that 
is inconsistent with international law.-” 
It is important to note the word “must” contained in both sections 39(1) and 233 of the 
Constitution, which ensures that international law, including international human rights 
law, will be considered by our courts. 
In addition to the first generation rights discussed above, the Bill of Rights incorporates 
a variety of socio-economic rights. This includes the right to a healthy environment,222 
the right to have access to adequate housing,223 health care, food, water and social 
security.224 These second generation rights are supported by rights of access to 
information,225 just administrative action226 and an interpretation of the Bill of Rights 
that supports an open democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom.227 
Under South African law, several bodies are mandated to pursue human rights that 
are embodied in the Constitution. These include the Public Protector,228 the Human 
Rights Commission,229 the Commission for Gender Equality,230 and the Commission 
for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic 
Communities.231 In addition to constitutionally mandated bodies, several human rights 
bodies, including the rights of Children and Rights of People with Disabilities, have 
been established in the office of the President. 
Both the provincial divisions and the Constitutional Court have considered 
international treaties and decisions in their interpretation of the Constitution and Bill of 
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Rights. The interpretation given by these courts is discussed within the framework of 
international human rights. 
2.4 The application of international human rights law in domestic case law  
Both the provincial divisions and the Constitutional Court have relied heavily on  
human rights treaties and decisions whilst interpreting of the Bill of Rights. 
Initially, there was concern that international human rights law may be narrowly 
interpreted,232 to cover only clear rules of customary law and human rights conventions 
to which South Africa was a party. This concern was dispelled by the Constitutional 
Court in S v Makwanyane and Another.233 In this case concerning the constitutionality 
of the death sentence, the Constitutional Court indicated that international 
agreements, including customary international law, could provide a framework within 
which the Bill of Rights could be evaluated and understood. The case referred to 
several international human rights commissions,234 including foreign law in the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Furman v Georgia,235 demonstrating a 
jurisprudentially expansive approach. Brennan J, in the Furman case, indicated that 
the significance of corporal punishment was that members of the human race were 
treated as non-humans, and that even the vilest criminal remains a human being 
possessed of common human dignity.  In S v Williams,236 the Constitutional Court 
investigated whether the sentence of juvenile whipping, pursuant to the provisions of 
the Criminal Procedure Act237 was consistent with the provisions of the Constitution. 
The Court 238 referred to foreign law in a similar case regarding corporal punishment 
to provide guidance.239 The Court 240 referred to the European Commission of Human 
Rights which found corporal punishment as an aggravated form of inhuman treatment, 
as well as the European Court of Human Rights, which categorised degrading conduct 
as that which aroused in its victims fear, anguish and humiliation. The Court241 also 
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referred to the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America 
as well as Article 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which prohibit 
cruel and unusual punishment. The Court in Tyrer v United Kingdom242  regarded the 
whipping of a juvenile as institutionalised violence which constituted an assault on the 
person’s dignity and physical integrity and was considered by the Constitutional Court. 
In Ferreira v Levin,243 the Constitutional Court referred to international jurisprudence 
for guidance in terms privacy and dignity of the individual. The Canadian position in 
Thompson Newspapers,244 indicated that the privacy, autonomy and dignity of a 
person must be respected by the state. In Ferreira v Levin,245 the Court referred to 
article 2 of the German Constitution for guidance on the term liberty. Article 2(2) of the 
German Constitution provides that: 
“-Everyone shall have the right to life and to the inviolability of his person. The liberty of the 
individual shall be inviable. These rights may be encroached upon pursuant to law.-”246 
Ackerman J, compared the German Constitutional position to the South African Interim 
Constitution, section 11(1). He found that “we are enjoined to protect the freedom 
guaranteed by section 11(1), against all government action that cannot be justified as 
necessary. Section 11 of the Interim Constitution of South Africa, later became section 
12 in the final Constitution, which was expanded to include the right to bodily and 
psychological integrity, specifically guaranteed in the European Convention on Human 
Rights.247  In Bernstein v Baxter, 248 decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 
were considered in an examination of the right to privacy.249 In re Gauteng School 
Education Bill 1995, 250 Mahomed DP referred to section 23 of the Canadian Charter, 
regarding linguistic minority rights of children to receive instruction in the language 
used in their particular province, and compared this right to the content of section 32(b) 
of the South African Interim Constitution. This section provided that “every person shall 
have the right to instruction in the language of his or her choice, where this is 
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reasonably practicable.” This was amended in the 1996 Constitution of South Africa251 
to read, “…everyone has the right to receive education in the official language of their 
choice in public educational institutions where reasonably practicable.” This subject 
was visited again in Hoerskool Ermelo and Another v Head, Department of Education, 
Mpumalanga, 252 where The State of African languages and Global Language 
Politics253 were referred to, in order to provide clarity to the education of minority 
groups in line with international human rights law. 
In Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie and Another254 Sachs J referred to article 16 of 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). These references provided additional 
information on the common law definition of marriage that was inconsistent with the 
Constitution of South Africa, because it unfairly discriminated against same-sex 
relationships. 
In Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele,255 the Court invoked a decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights in support of its finding that there is a positive duty 
on the state to protect an individual whose life was at risk from the criminal acts of 
another individual. This supports section 12(1)(c) of the Bill of Rights where everyone 
has the right to freedom and security and be free from all forms of public and private 
violence. 
In Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa v Minister of Health,256 the 
jurisprudence of the European Court was invoked in order to dismiss a challenge to 
the constitutionality of abortion legislation. 
In National Media Ltd v Bogoshi,257 Hefer JA, referred to the European Court of Human 
Rights regarding freedom of expression and the right of the public at large to receive 
information on matters of public interest. The South African Bill of Rights, section 
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16(1)(b) Freedom of Expression, provides that everyone has the right to receive or 
impart information or ideas, which does not extend to the incitement of violence, hatred 
or the causing of harm to others. 
Recourse to international law as prescribed in section 39(1)(b) in the Bill of Rights may 
not always advance the rights of the individual. In Prince v President of the Law 
Society, Cape of Good Hope, 258 the Constitutional Court found that international 
norms on religious freedom (in the case of a Rastafarian’s use of cannabis for religious 
purposes) were outweighed by South Africa’s international obligations, intended to 
suppress drug abuse. This demonstrates that a court is not confined to international 
human rights treaties when it acts under section 39(1)(b) of the Bill of Rights.259  
It must be remembered that the Constitution is not the only legal instrument to promote 
the harmonisation of South African law and international human rights law. The Labour 
Relations Act260 maintains that one of the primary objects of the Act261 is to give effect 
to the obligations incurred by the Republic as a member of the International Labour 
Organisation. Similarly, the Refugees Act, 262 provides that the Act must be interpreted 
with due regard to the principal refugee conventions263 and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights.264  
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated international human rights law and its incorporation into 
the South African Constitution. In addition, the role of international law in the 
interpretation of South African law has been examined. The interpretation given by the 
courts has supported the development and protection of human rights, with generous 
reference to international human rights instruments. 
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This investigation of international human rights law is now considered in the context 
of the history, formation, jurisdiction and composition of the International Criminal 
Court, (ICC).     
                                                          
CHAPTER 3  The history, formation, jurisdiction and composition of the 
International Criminal Court, (ICC) 
3.1 Introduction 
The greater implications of South Africa’s possible withdrawal from the ICC are 
brought sharply into focus when considering the historical background of its formation. 
So many eminent jurists have contributed their work and experience over an extended 
period, resulting in the formation of the ICC. One should consider the many 
devastating events that have plagued the world, including the development of 
international crimes, which has accelerated the demand for this eminent court. 
3.2 Historical context and formation 
In July 1998, at a United Nations (UN) conference in Rome, Italy, several governments 
approved a statute to promote the establishment of a permanent International Criminal 
Court, the ICC.  By 31 December 2000, 139 states had signed the treaty. Subsequently 
on 11 April 2002, the Rome Statute of the ICC received more than the 60 ratifications 
required, including South Africa. The treaty then came into force on 1 July 2002.265 
The road to Rome has been a long and arduous route to travel. Hall believes that the 
idea of some form of international justice system can be traced back to the 19th 
century.266 It is only in the last half century that there have been coordinated attempts 
to achieve such a system. In 1872, Gustav Moynier, (featured on an historic stamp in 
Illustration 1 below) one of the founders of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, proposed a permanent court to recognise the crimes committed during the 
Franco-Prussian war.267 This war raged on from 1870 until 1871, and was contested 
between the Second French Empire of Napoleon III, and the German states of the 
North German Confederation, led by the Kingdom of Prussia. 
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The next serious development occurred after the First World War, with the signing of 
the 1919 Treaty of Versailles at the Paris Peace Conference.268 This began on 18 
January 1919 and was regarded by Slavicek as a milestone in World history.269 
Unsuccessful attempts were made to bring the German Emperor to trial before an 
international tribunal,270 and later to try the Turks responsible for the genocide of 
Armenians before a tribunal designated by the Allied Powers.271 
                                                          Illustration 1 
                  Gustav Moynier, Founder Member of the International Red Cross 
                       
 
In 1937, following the assassination in 1934 of King Alexander of Yugoslavia by 
Croatian nationalists in the French city of Marseilles, treaties were formulated to outlaw 
international terrorism.272  It was intended that these treaties would provide for the trial 
of international terrorists before an internationally constituted tribunal. As the Second 
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World War approached, states lost interest in this venture, and no state ratified the 
treaty to establish an international court.273 
Following the outbreak of the Second World War, an aggressive campaign was 
conducted by Germany. The subsequent atrocities committed by its officials and 
soldiers provided the impetus for the creation by the Allied powers of an ad hoc 
international military tribunal.274 Following World War II, the Allies established the 
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal of 1945 and 1946 to try war criminals. Ball 
suggests that these trials introduced a new radical approach to International Law, 
which imposed considerable influence on the post-war international community. This 
generated a desire for a similar permanent based international court.275 
The reason for the establishment of a permanent based international court was mainly 
because the trials set a precedent in creating new standards of international law, and 
subsequently, a new concept of international law emerged focussing on war crimes 
and humanitarian issues. 
A similar tribunal was established in Tokyo in 1946 in respect of three types of war 
crimes committed by Japanese leaders.276   
The establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo international military tribunals that 
tried the principal German and Japanese leaders for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, was a natural progression of the pre-war debate over an international 
criminal court.277 
Ehrenfreund believed that the Nuremberg trials demonstrated the power and ability to 
try specific individuals for crimes. This also highlighted the accountability for all these 
individuals, regardless of military, political or social position.278 
In October 1946, soon after the Nuremberg Judgements were handed down, an 
international congress met in Paris to probe the adoption of an international criminal 
code. This code prohibited crimes against humanity and promoted the establishment 
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of an International Criminal Court. Baros279 reported that on 9 December 1948, the 
United Nations General Assembly adopted The Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.280  The Convention came into force on 12 
January 1951. The parties to the Genocide Convention are shown below in Illustration 
No 2, where it can clearly be seen that most countries in the world had either signed 
and ratified or acceded or succeeded to the Convention. Roach believes that it was 
the paradigm shift within the international community regarding their attitude to 
criminal justice that prompted the United Nations to energise the International Law 
Commission (ILC) activities.281 
                                                                                  Illustration 2. 
                          World countries participating in the Genocide Convention 
                                          
           Source: The Genocide Convention. United Nations Treaty Series Adopted by the UN on 9 December 1948 
 
It is interesting to note that one of the first accusations of genocide submitted to the 
United Nations after the Convention entered into force concerned the treatment of the 
Black people in the United States of America (USA). The Civil Rights Congress, 
represented by William Patterson, drafted a petition arguing that the USA had been 
responsible for hundreds of wrongful deaths and genocidal abuses.282 The petition was 
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presented to the United Nations in December 1951. It is interesting to observe that the 
USA was a vocal opponent of the South African system of “apartheid.”283 This racial 
abuse in the USA was manifested in the system of slavery, prevalent in the Southern 
States of North America, which has been regarded by Finkelman as one of the primary 
causes of their Civil War.284 
From 1949 until 1954 the ILC drafted statutes for an International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Opposition from influential states of the Cold War, specifically the USA and Russia, 
hampered these efforts.285 The United Nations General Assembly effectively 
abandoned the effort, pending an acceptable definition of the crime of aggression and 
an International Code of Crimes. 
Impeded by the Cold War, it was not until 1989 that interest once again resurfaced 
among the international community. Even the agreement between East and West over 
apartheid in South Africa, failed to produce a court that had been proposed during the 
late 1970s to try the apartheid criminals.286 In 1979, the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission instructed Professor Bassiouni to draft a statute for an international court 
to try offenders under the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.287 A statute was drafted but no further action 
was taken on the project. 
Kreiger believed that it was Arthur Robinson, the then President of Trinidad and 
Tobago, who resurrected the proposal for the establishment of an international 
court.288 His proposal was motivated by the will to create some form of structure to 
address the growing international problem of drug trafficking. This was supported by 
the increase of international crimes provided by treaties outlawing hijacking of aircraft, 
(The Hague Convention, effective 14 October 1971)289 and seizure of ships on the 
high seas, including attacks on diplomats. In response, the United Nations General 
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Assembly requested that the ILC continue working on the previously abandoned draft 
statute and code of crimes. 
Weber points out that following the termination of the Cold War, there was a 
considerable change in the political environment.290 Some subsequent violators of 
human rights lost their Cold War aura of protection, and their actions gained 
prominence on the international stage. 
The concept of a permanent international criminal court was subsequently placed on 
the agenda by Latin American States. They believed that such a court would assist 
the prosecution of international drug-traffickers, which had a devastating social effect 
on their region.291 
While the Statute of the ICC was once again being revised by the United Nations 
General Assembly ILC, the early 1990s witnessed two landmark events that 
strengthened the momentum for the development of an International Criminal Court. 
The atrocities that occurred in the former Yugoslavia under Slobodan Milosevic, 
described by Blumenthal and McCormack,292  were put on trial in 1993 under an ad 
hoc International Criminal Tribunal.293 This Tribunal was then established by the UN 
Security Council. Similarly in 1994, the leaders of the Rwandan genocide were put on 
trial under another United Nations Security Council ad hoc Tribunal.294 
Furamura describes situations that occurred in both the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda as “threats to international peace and security.295 The tribunals were created 
as a direct response to these concerns and specifically were undertaken as a 
necessary measure in order to enforce Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. 
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In July 1998 a United Nations (UN) ad hoc committee of the UN General Assembly, 
established a three-year Preparatory Committee to finalise a text to be presented at a 
conference of plenipotentiaries.296 
From 15 June to 17 July 1998, 160 countries, including South Africa, participated in 
the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an 
international criminal Court in Rome. These debates subsequently were reflected in 
the Rome Statute.297 One hundred and twenty nations voted to adopt the International 
Criminal Court under the Rome Statute, with seven voting against. 
                                                         Illuustration 3 
                                                                                             
Source:              International Criminal Court asp.icc-cpi.int/ referenced on 3 February 2018 
The nations voting against were the USA,298 Israel, China, Iraq, Algeria, Libya and 
Yemen. Unfortunately, on 6 May 2002, the United States government under the Bush 
Administration, formally announced to the United Nations, the United States 
government intended not to ratify the Rome Statute.299 In its view, the USA was no 
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longer bound by the terms of the Treaty, which was previously implied by the signature 
of the Clinton Administration in December 2001. Ever since the International Criminal 
Court’s subsequent establishment in 2002, the Court has experienced active 
opposition from the United States (US) government. This was due to the possibility 
that US military and political leaders would be held accountable to politically motivated 
international justice for their previous actions in warfare.300 These concerns were 
conveyed by the Bush Administration, which then threatened to veto all UN 
peacekeeping operations, unless granted a twelve-month blanket immunity. This was 
renewed for the second time a year later. The Bush Administration was concerned 
over the public outcry over the treatment of prisoners of war in Iraq and the notorious 
Guantanamo Bay detention centre. This centre is an offshore prison for criminals 
considered a threat to American national security.301 
To date, the Rome Statute has been signed by 139 states and ratified by 117 states. 
Of those 117 states, a significant proportion, 31, are from Africa. 
The US opposition to the Rome Statute could be seen as an objection to the exercise 
of the ICC’s jurisdiction, which directly implicates the principle of complementarity.302 
The drafters of the Rome Statute decided that national courts should have primary 
jurisdiction.303 Under the Rome Statute, the proper role of the ICC is to complement 
national court jurisdictions and assist when States do not comply with their obligations 
to prosecute the perpetrators of serious international crimes.304 
On 1 July 2002, following the formula set out in the Rome Statute, the Treaty came 
into force, becoming binding for all countries that had positively ratified or acceded to 
the Statute. Ehrenfreund   pointed out that the enforcement of the Treaty which marked 
the official opening of the ICC, occurred almost seventy years after its initial stages of 
development.305 
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The author considers that the origin and critical development of the ICC are extremely 
dependent on human rights violations in the post Second World War era. Highly 
publicised areas of international conflict radically changed political and social 
dispensations. The advent of affordable television and the mass distribution of 
newsprint promoted a wider appreciation of world events and associated human rights. 
On 11 March 2003, the first of eighteen judges were sworn-in during a ceremony in 
The Hague, Netherlands.306 Trinidadian Queen’s Council (QC) Karl Hudson-Philips 
was the first judge to be sworn-in at a gala ceremony at the Knight’s Hall of the Dutch 
Parliament. Hudson-Philips was the most senior of the first eighteen judges. It was 
fitting that this honour should be bestowed, as the former President of Trinidad and 
Tobago, President Robinson, had been instrumental in getting the UN to place the 
idea of the ICC on the UN General Assembly’s agenda. 
On June 16 2003, the first Prosecutor, Mr Louis Moreno-Ocampo of Argentina was 
sworn-in at The Hague, Netherlands.307 
Subsequently on 24 June 2003, Mr Bruno Cathala from France was appointed 
Registrar of the ICC, marking the selection of the final ICC official. 
By March 2003, there were 139 signatories and 89 parties to the Statute. There were 
21 African States, 21 non-European states, 15 European Union States, 18 Latin-
American and Caribbean States, 12 Asia and Pacific States, one Middle-East State 
and one North American State.308 
3.3 The context of the jurisdiction of the ICC 
Cryer309 has noted that according to Article 5 of the Rome Statute,310 the ICC will have 
jurisdiction with respect to the crime of genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. The crime of aggression was ingeniously included when determining that 
the ICC will have jurisdiction to try this crime once an agreed definition of aggression 
has been developed.311 
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 The jurisdiction of the ICC has to be understood in various contexts. Jurisdiction 
ratione materiae is concerned with crimes that can be tried before the ICC.312 
Jurisdiction ratione personae is concerned with who can be tried before the ICC,313 
whilst jurisdiction ratione temporis concerns itself with the period within which crimes 
are tried before the court.314  A positive feature of Article 7 of the Statute is a recognition 
that crimes against humanity may be committed not only in time of war, but in 
peacetime as well. This is a reflection of the law that was developed by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).315  
According to Article 13 of the Statute, the exercise of jurisdiction is triggered by the 
referral of a particular situation to the Prosecutor of the ICC.316 This can be achieved 
either by a State Party or the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the UN, or when the Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of 
crimes for which the Court may exercise jurisdiction. The Court will determine if a case 
is inadmissible if it is being investigated by a State having jurisdiction, unless the State 
is unwilling or genuinely unable to carry out the investigation.317 
The ICC is intended to act complementarily with a state’s national courts, and is 
enabled by individuals only when national courts are unwilling or unable to do so. The 
notion of complementarity is central to the understanding that national courts take 
priority over the ICC unless they are unable to act accordingly. 
There are several pre-conditions to the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction. A state that 
ratifies the Rome Statute accepts jurisdiction of the ICC with crimes listed under article 
5 of the Rome Statute.318 This implies that there must be some form of nationality or 
territorial connection between the accused person and the state party to the Rome 
Statute. Similarly, the ICC has jurisdiction over nationals of all states that have ratified 
the Rome Statute, regardless of the place where they commit a crime.319  The Rome 
Statute has also made provision for the exercise of its jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis. 
This occurs when a non-state party to the Rome Statute accepts to submit to the 
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jurisdiction of the ICC on a temporary basis.320 An example of this situation was the 
referral to the ICC by Cote D’Ivoire in 2005. This provision allows a state that has a 
territorial or nationality nexus to a crime within the jurisdiction of the court, to accept 
the jurisdiction of the ICC without ratifying the Rome Statute.321 The principle of 
universal jurisdiction was rejected in the Rome Statute.322 It was argued by some 
states that since states have universal jurisdiction over core crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the court, that the same jurisdiction should be conferred on the ICC.323It 
is interesting to note that three states that vehemently opposed the universal 
jurisdiction of the ICC, namely the USA, Russian Federation and China have not 
ratified the Rome Statute, but are permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC). These three states also have veto powers in the UNSC, and can also 
refer non states-parties to the ICC. 
Other limitations to the ICC’s jurisdiction include the ne bis in idem principle of double 
jeopardy. This legal principle means that legal action cannot be instituted twice for the 
same cause of action. The ICC cannot have jurisdiction over a person who was 
previously tried for the same conduct.324 The ICC also cannot have jurisdiction over a 
case where the case is not of a serious nature. In making this decision the court is 
called upon to consider paragraph 10 of the preamble.325 The ICC also has no 
jurisdiction over persons below the age of eighteen.326 Since the ICC is based on the 
principle of complementarity, national legal systems would assume jurisdiction over 
those under the age of eighteen years.327 
The jurisdiction over nationals of non-state parties is provided for in Article 13(b) of the 
Rome Statute, which states: 
“-The court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in Article 5 in accordance 
with the provisions of the Statute, if a situation in which one or more such crimes appears to have 
been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations.-”  
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This jurisdiction over nationals of non-state parties who commit offences within the 
jurisdiction of the court on the territories of non-state parties has been exemplified in 
the Sudanese328 and Libyan329 situations. Referrals in both these situations were in 
the form of a UN Security Council resolution. 
3.4 Composition, structure and financing of the ICC 
The ICC is composed of the following organs: the Presidency; An Appeals Division, a 
Trial Division and a Pre-Trial Division; the Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry.330 
There are 18 judges in the ICC.331 These judges are chosen according to a high 
standard of moral character, impartiality and integrity. They must also possess the 
qualifications required in their respective States for appointment to the highest judicial 
offices.332 The judges serve three-year terms. 
The Presidency is comprised of three judges, who are elected from the 18 judges in 
the ICC. The Presidency is comprised of The President of the Court, a First Vice-
President and a Second Vice-President. Once elected, these judges oversee the 
management of the ICC, including all judicial, administrative and external relations.333 
The Judicial Divisions of the ICC are the Appeals Division, the Trial Division and Pre-
Trial Division. The President sits on the Appeals Division, along with four other judges. 
The Trial and Pre-Trial Divisions consist of at least six judges each, but their 
proceedings consist of three judges.334  
The Office of Prosecutor receives referrals for cases and information on crimes within 
the Court’s jurisdiction from States, the UN Security Council or on their own initiative. 
The Prosecutor then conducts investigations and potentially prosecutes cases before 
the Court.335 
The Registry, headed by the Registrar, is responsible for the non-judicial aspects of 
the administration and servicing the Court, without prejudice to the functions and 
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powers of the Prosecutor.  The Registry will typically secure victims and witnesses for 
future appearance before the ICC.336 
The work of the Court is presided over by an Assembly of States Parties, which 
provides management oversight, assesses budget requirements and conducts 
elections.337 The Assembly of States Parties meets at least once a year.338 
The ICC is currently funded by assessed contributions made by States Parties and 
funds that have been allocated by the United Nations.339 In addition, the Statute 
provides that the ICC may receive and utilise voluntary contributions from international 
organisations, corporations and Governments. These funds are allocated and used in 
accordance with laid down criteria, which are then adopted by the Assembly of States 
Parties. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The formation of the ICC has evolved over centuries of conflict and hostility between 
the nations of the world resulting in untold hardship to both participants and civilians. 
International military tribunals that developed following major conflicts introduced a 
new radical approach to International Law, which generated the desire and impetus to 
form a permanent based international court. The emergence of social crimes, such as 
drug-trafficking and international terrorism, stimulated the desire for accountability, 
irrespective of one’s social, political or military standing. A wide cross-section of 
countries contributed to the development of the Rome Statute, which gave the body 
international standing and credibility. 
Following this current investigation of the history, formation, jurisdiction and 
composition of the ICC, it is now appropriate to consider how South Africa ratified the 
Rome Statute, and introduced the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002. 
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CHAPTER 4.  South Africa’s ratification and domestication of the Rome Statute 
4.1 Introduction 
On 17 July 1998, South Africa signed and ratified the Rome Statute, becoming the 
23rd State Party.340 This ratification was authorised by President Nelson Mandela, who 
regarded both the ICC and South Africa as a positive force for regional peace and 
prosperity. By being one of the first states to ratify the Rome Statute, South Africa 
signalled its dedication to the rule of law on both the national and international arena. 
Where South Africa’s signature is subject to ratification, the initial signature does not 
establish the consent to be bound. South Africa’s initial signature qualified the 
signatory state to proceed to ratification.341 Ratification defined the international act 
whereby South Africa indicated its consent to be bound by the Rome Statute. The 
process of ratification granted the necessary time for the National Assembly (NA) and 
the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), to approve the statute and enact the 
necessary legislation to give domestic effect to that treaty.342 In order to domesticate 
the obligations prescribed in the Rome Statute, the South African parliament drafted 
The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 
2002, (the ICC Act) which became law on 16 August 2002.343  
The 1996 Constitution of South Africa is inspired by and aligned to provisions of the 
Vienna Convention, which allows final consent to be bound by a treaty to be given by 
ratification, accession or signature.344 Section 231 of the 1996 Constitution indicates 
a return to the pre-1994 position relating to the incorporation of treaties which included 
the need for parliamentary ratification of treaties. For example, Section 231(3) 
provides: 
(3) An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an 
agreement which does not require either ratification of accession, entered into by the 
national executive, binds the Republic without approval by the National Assembly and 
the National Council of Provinces, but must be tabled in the Assembly within a 
reasonable time. 
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A more precise meaning of the terms “technical, administrative or executive” in Section 
231(3) in the context of treaty law,345 depends on the intention of the parties 
concerned. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties346 emphasises the intention 
of the parties to decide whether or not a treaty requires ratification. This principle was 
approved by the South African Appellate Division in S v Eliasov.347 
It is interesting to note that in The President of the Republic of South Africa v Quagliani 
and Others348 the Constitutional Court indicated that the President, as head of state 
and head of the national executive, has the power to enter into treaties in terms of a 
specific Act. He is also obliged to act “in a collaborative manner” to exercise this 
authority. This “collaborative manner” of conduct suggests an interaction with 
Parliament including discussions as to the merits of entering into international 
agreements. It would be natural to suggest therefore, that withdrawal from an 
international agreement would warrant a “collaborative manner” of interaction with 
Parliament.349  
The relationship that developed between South Africa and the ICC, following the 
ratification and domestication of the Rome Statute is a result of the particular principle 
of complementarity. This principle proceeds from the belief that a national court should 
be the first to act in terms of prosecuting an international criminal act. Only when a 
State Party is unwilling or unable to investigate and prosecute an international crime 
committed by its nationals or on its own territory, is the ICC then seized with 
jurisdiction.350 The ICC Act facilitates the complementarity obligation on South African 
courts to domestically investigate and prosecute ICC offences. This principle of 
complementarity is now more fully investigated. 
4.2 The principle of complementarity 
Complementarity is a fundamental principle on which the functioning of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) is based, and refers to the complementarity of its 
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jurisdiction to national criminal jurisdictions.351 The Rome Statute which established 
the ICC is an international, multilateral treaty. According to the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties,352 provisions of a treaty shall be interpreted with due regard to its 
object and purpose. Under the Rome Statute, which established the Court, the ICC 
can only positively exercise its jurisdiction, where the State Party of which the accused 
is a national, is unable or unwilling to prosecute.353 This means that the term 
“complementarity” indicates that the ICC is a Court of last resort. 
The principle of complementarity is implemented by the Court through Articles 17 and 
53 of the Rome Statute, which deals with the conditions for a specific case to be 
admissible at the ICC.  Article 17(2) defines the term “unwillingness” of a State Party 
to prosecute as: 
“-proceedings for the purposes of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility 
for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, or proceedings that are “not conducted 
independently or impartially, and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is 
inconsistent with the intent to bring the person concerned to justice.-” 
The most evident underlying interest that the complementarity regime of the Court is 
designed to protect and serve, is the sovereignty of both State Parties and third states. 
The exercise of criminal jurisdiction can be considered a central and determining 
aspect of sovereignty itself.354 As distinct from the right of states to exercise their own 
criminal jurisdiction over crimes contained in the Rome Statute, the Preamble of the 
Statute also refers to the duty of every state (not limited to State Parties) to exercise 
its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.355 The purpose 
of the complementarity principle would be to ensure that states abide by that duty, 
either by prosecuting the alleged perpetrators themselves, or by providing for an 
international prosecution in case of their failure to do so. It would appear that the 
principle of complementarity was designed to allow for the prosecution of crimes at 
international level, where national systems were failing to deter any future commission 
of crimes. In addition, the duty to prosecute, including the complementarity principle, 
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encourages states to exercise their jurisdiction and make the system of international 
criminal law enforcement more effective.356 
Another possible reason behind the principle of complementarity, may be the right of 
the accused to be prosecuted by domestic authorities and tried before a domestic 
court. This would of course depend on whether or not those authorities and courts 
were unable or unwilling to do so. It should be remembered that the accused or 
suspect may, in terms of the Rome Statute,357 still challenge the admissibility of the 
case. 
A practical aspect driving the principle of complementarity may be the realisation that 
the Court’s scope for action could be limited by resource constraints.358 In addition, 
the complementarity principle appreciates that national authorities are closer to 
evidence and that the crimes falling under the jurisdiction of these Courts, are normally 
best prosecuted in the state where they have been committed.359 The complementarity 
principle is not just a political concession, but a substantive operating rule that 
recognises that trials closer to the scene of events at issue have inherent practical as 
well as expressive value.360 
It could, in conclusion, be stated that the principle of complementarity has been 
primarily designed to strike an even balance between state sovereignty to exercise 
jurisdiction, and the understanding that for the effective prevention of these crimes, 
the international community must promote its objectives of maintaining sound 
international law. In addition, the principle of complementarity removes the possibility 
for the States Parties to remain inactive, even under the breach of international law in 
cases where the duty to prosecute exists under other instruments.  The principle finally 
gives effect to and completes the idea of an effective decentralised prosecution of 
international crimes361 including the promotion of an enhanced international criminal 
justice system. 
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4.3 International criminal law 
International criminal law may be described as a body of international rules prescribing 
international crimes and regulating principles and procedures regulating the 
investigation, prosecution and punishment of such crimes.362 The history and 
development of the International Criminal Court (ICC), described above in Chapter 3, 
included the duty of every state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those 
responsible for international crimes.363 Individuals accused of international crimes are 
ordinarily tried before domestic courts, 364 but more recently, the ICC and other 
tribunals have been established to prosecute international crimes.365 Although there 
is no single, unified international criminal procedure, consistent procedural rules have 
developed from the practice and jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals. Each 
court, however, would exercise its own rules of procedure and evidence. 
International criminal law can be divided into substantive and procedural criminal law. 
Substantive international criminal law defines international crimes, the subjective 
elements of such crimes and the conditions under which a state must, under 
international rules, prosecute a person accused of such international crimes.366 
Procedural international law regulates the various stages of international trials, 
including admission of evidence and the protection of victims and witnesses. 
International criminal law may be classified as a hybrid of international law and national 
criminal law. The sources of international criminal law are the same as the sources of 
international law. International criminal law is also based on the principles derived from 
national criminal law, which emerged from two major world legal systems.367 These 
include   common law or adversarial system, and civil law or inquisitorial system. At 
present, there is no uniform, worldwide criminal code, which lists all the international 
crimes. Each international court, such as the ICC, provides in its statutes a list of 
international crimes in order to clearly determine its jurisdiction. There is currently no 
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truly universal court; the existing international courts and tribunals all have their own 
limited jurisdiction, but strive to promote international cooperation.368 
In the Preamble to the Rome Statute, the most serious crimes that are of concern to 
the international community which threaten peace, security and the well-being of the 
world, included: 
 Genocide 
 War crimes 
 Crimes against humanity 
 Crimes of aggression (also referred to as crimes against peace) 
The ICC, including the ICTY and ICTR tribunals, have been given jurisdiction over 
these crimes, which are also referred to as “core crimes.” In the broader sense, the list 
of international crimes include piracy, terrorism, slavery, unlawful offences committed 
on board aircraft, and serious apartheid offences.369 During the negotiations on 
establishing the ICC, there were discussions concerning the inclusion of terrorist 
offences and drug trafficking. Although these were considered extremely serious 
crimes, they were not included within the Court’s jurisdiction. It has subsequently 
became impossible to reach agreement on the definitions of these two crimes.370  
Since International criminal law is a branch of international public law, its legal sources 
are derived from Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).371 
According to paragraph 1 of Article 38 of the ICJ statute, the sources of international 
law, in order, are: 
 International conventions 
 International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law 
 General principles of law as recognised by the community of nations372 
 Judicial decisions and the teachings of highly qualified publicists  
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This classification is considered by the author as inadequate, since the provision fails 
to acknowledge the importance of other instruments which serve as credible sources 
of international law. This would include binding resolutions of the UN Security Council 
adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Another important source of 
international criminal law is the Statutes of the international courts and tribunals.373 
Some of these statutes are in fact treaties, which would fall under the general category 
of international conventions listed under article 38. For example, the Rome Statute of 
the ICC, which lists the international crimes falling within the Court’s jurisdiction,374 
general principle of international criminal law, and the procedure brought before the 
Court. 
4.4 Pre-conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction of the ICC 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (the Statute), was adopted on 
17 July 1998. To date the Statute has been signed by 139 states and ratified by 117 
states.375 The Statute now strictly defines the jurisdiction of the court.376 By 11 April, 
2002, 66 countries had ratified the Statute. (Six more than the required threshold) This 
meant that the ICC’s temporal jurisdiction commenced on 1 July 2002.377 For those 
states that became a party to the Statute after 1 July 2001, the ICC has jurisdiction 
only over crimes committed after confirmed entry into force of the Statute, with respect 
to that state.378 The ICC is not a convenient remedy of crimes of the past, which must 
in future be addressed by national, international or hybrid initiatives.379 
The pre-conditions to the exercise of jurisdiction for the ICC to exercise its competence 
are set out in article 12 of the Statute. This article provides that the court may exercise 
jurisdiction if the state where the alleged crime was committed is a party to the Statute, 
either in terms of territoriality,380 or in terms of nationality, where the state of which the 
accused is a national is a party to the Statute.381 In terms of article 14 of the Statute, 
a State Party may then refer to the Prosecutor, a situation in which one or more crimes 
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appear to have been committed, within the jurisdiction of the court. This process can 
be applied as long as the pre-conditions to the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction have 
been met. These are that the alleged perpetrators of the crimes are nationals of a 
State Party, or the crimes are committed on the territory of a State Party.382 There has 
been uncertainty as to whether article 14 allowed a State Party to refer alleged crimes 
committed in its own territory or whether the mechanism was intended as an inter-
state referral mechanism.383 The subsequent decision of the ICC Appeals Chamber in 
the Katanga384 case has since clarified that self-referrals are permissible under article 
14 of the Statute. The Appeals Chamber indicated that such referrals are indeed 
consistent with the Rome Statute’s “object and purpose of eradicating impunity for 
international crimes.” 
The Prosecutor, in terms of the Statute,385 could institute investigations proprio motu 
on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. This issue 
was debated at length by the drafters of the Statute. It was finally determined that in 
order for the Prosecutor to exercise this power, the alleged crimes must have been 
committed by national of a State Party, or have taken place within the territory of a 
State Party. These pre-conditions were set out in terms of article 12 of the Statute.386 
In terms of the Statute,387 the UN Security Council is empowered to refer to the Court 
“situations” in which crimes appear to have been committed within the jurisdiction of 
the Court. This referral power is a mechanism by which the Court is accorded 
jurisdiction over an offender, regardless of where the offence occurred, and by whom 
it was committed. This referral can occur regardless of whether a state concerned has 
ratified the Statute or accepted the Court’s decision.388 The Statute provides that the 
UN Security Council may only make such a referral by acting under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. It must regard events in a particular country as a threat to peace, a breach 
of the peace or an act of aggression.389 Considering these factors, the UN Security 
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Council in March 2005, referred the atrocities committed in the Darfur region of Sudan 
to the International Criminal Court for investigation.390 
The crimes over which the jurisdiction of the Court are limited, and constitute the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community.391 The Court has jurisdiction 
in accordance with this Statute with respect to the crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.392 
The Rome Statute is silent on amnesty, and it is argued that this is because the Statute 
was never drafted with the intention of allowing amnesty to trump the Court’s 
jurisdiction.393 
The jurisdiction of the ICC has had a marked influence on the elevation of the visibility 
and commitment to human rights, desperately needed within the international 
community. This issue will now be further explored in relation to South Africa’s ICC 
membership. 
4.5 Membership of the ICC cements South Africa’s national commitment to 
human rights 
Before 1994,394 there was little that South African courts could, or would do, about 
international human rights. 
South Africa was a party to only one instrument with human rights clauses, the Charter 
of the United Nations, which was not incorporated into municipal law.395 Consequently 
no direct effect could be provided to articles 55 and 56 of the Charter. In S v Werner,396 
the Appellate Division failed to take into account international human rights norms. 
This followed the decision in Minister of the Interior v Lockhat 397 where the Appellate 
Division failed to take into account international human rights norms when giving its 
approval to the zoning of different residential areas for different races by means of a 
proclamation. 
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Since 1994, the situation has changed dramatically. South Africa is a party to major 
human rights instruments398 and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. 
In addition, the 1996 Constitution requires courts to consider international human 
rights instruments in their application of the Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution.399 
In 1998, South Africa signed and ratified the Rome Statute and thereby joined other 
state parties in affirming its commitment to the rule of law and to end impunity for the 
perpetrators of international crimes. Ratifying the Rome Statute was a tacit recognition 
that human rights extend beyond geopolitical boundaries and interests, indicating that 
a collective commitment is required to uphold these rights.400 The commitment to the 
Rome Statute, and active participation in its development, was a reaffirmation of South 
Africa’s commitment and dedication to human rights and the rule of law. 
In 1993, President Nelson Mandela stated that South Africa’s constitutional 
commitment to human rights, improved international relations, hereby demonstrating 
a commitment to peace, prosperity and goodwill.401 
The South African Human Rights Commission,402 (hereafter the Commission) is a 
state institution established in terms of the Constitution.403 The Commission’s task is 
to support constitutional democracy and is clearly mandated by the Constitution 404 to 
promote, respect, monitor, and assess the observance of human rights in South Africa. 
In the Commission’s view, the intended exit of South Africa from the ICC would not 
bode well for the rule of law. This would include the consideration of human rights, a 
principle to which South Africa was committed, in the Preamble of the Implementation 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act.405 In addition, the 
Preamble emphasised that South Africa had since 1994 become an integrated 
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member of the community of nations and was mindful of the recognition of international 
human rights abuse. 
The Constitutional Court explained the inter-relationship between South Africa’s 
obligations contained in international law and its domestic law, in National 
Commissioner of Police v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre.406 The 
Court explained that torture is criminalised in South Africa through the enactment of 
the Torture Act407 and operation of sections 232 and 233 of the Constitution, providing 
for the application of international law in conjunction with the ICC Act. 
The current South African government faces growing criticism from human rights 
organisations regarding issues such as the Marikana massacre,408 increasing police 
brutality and farm murders. Leaving the ICC would tarnish South Africa’s reputation 
and intent to be known as a democratic beacon in Africa, leaving the distinct 
impression as one who shied away from its international obligation to human rights 
and justice. Could it be, that the notice of intent to withdraw from the ICC, subsequently 
declared unconstitutional, used the President Omar al-Bashir incident as a convenient 
excuse to leave the ICC, as senior government leaders and officials fear future 
prosecution for human rights abuse by the ICC? 
The implementation of the ICC Act409 in August 2002 cemented South Africa’s 
commitment to human rights. Prior to the passing of this Act, South Africa had not 
tabled any domestic legislation on the subject of war crimes or crimes against 
humanity. Furthermore, no domestic prosecutions of international crimes had 
occurred. The domestication of South Africa’s obligations to the Rome Statute will now 
be investigated, including the creation of the Priority Crimes Litigation Unit (PCLU) 
appointed in terms of the National Prosecuting Authority Act.410 
 
                                                          
406 National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation 
Centre and Another (CCT 02/14)[2014] ZACC 30; 2015 (1) SA 315 (CC) [39]. 
407 Prevention and Combatting of Torture of Persons Act 13 of 2013. 
408 The Marikana massacre. From 10 August to 20 September 2012 where 34 miners were killed by security 
forces. 
409 See note 98 above. 
410 Section 13(1)(c) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998. 
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4.6 An introduction to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 
27 of 2002 
In order to comply with its complementarity obligations under the Rome Statute, South 
Africa incorporated the Rome Statute into its domestic law by means of the 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 
2002,411 (the ICC Act). The ICC Act was approved on 12 July 2002 and signed by the 
President on 16 August 2002. The ICC Act should be interpreted within the context of 
the Constitution412 and the Rome Statute.413 An inter-departmental committee, under 
the direction of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, was tasked 
to study the Rome Statute, establishing that the Rome Statute was constitutional and 
no amendments were required. The ratification of the Rome Statute required that an 
explanatory memorandum should be attached prior to forwarding to Parliament.414 
In order to assist implementation, the South African Development Community (SADC), 
of which South Africa is a member, presented member states with a “Model Enabling 
Act” in 1999,415 which incorporated all international Criminal Court-related matters in 
one statute, with the Rome Statute itself appended as a schedule. As a result, the 
Rome Statute is annexed to the ICC Act. 
The passing of the ICC Act was a significant event. Prior to this Act, South Africa had 
no domestic legislation focussed on war crimes or crimes against humanity. No 
domestic prosecutions of international crimes had previously occurred in South Africa. 
One of the advantages of the ICC Act is that it coordinates a codified statement of the 
elements which constitute the crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. The drafters of the ICC Act, incorporated the ICC’s Statute’s definitions of  
core crimes directly into South African law through a schedule appended to the Act.416 
                                                          
411 The ICC Act as amended by the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 22 of 2005. Section 231(4) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides that “any international agreement becomes law in the 
Republic when it is enacted into law by national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that 
has been approved by Parliament is law unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.”  
412 Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution of South Africa 1996. 
413 Article 21 of the Rome Statute. 
414 The South African Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development introduced the International 
Criminal Court Bill [B42B-2001] in Parliament as a Section 75 Bill. Section 75 of the 1996 Constitution refers to 
the procedure in passing Bills that do not amend the Constitution (s. 74) or affect Provinces (S.76). 
415 SADC Conference on the Ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, MODEL 
Enabling Act, DC/REP/RAT/D.A. 1999, Pretoria, 1999. 
416 Dugard J, International Law: A South African Perspective 201. 
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The ICC Act also provides for the amendment of domestic laws417 in order to align 
them with definitions provided under the Rome Statute, including areas of cooperation 
regarding the arrest and surrender of persons.418  
The approach adopted by the ICC Act, providing South African courts extended 
jurisdiction to accommodate crimes committed outside the territory of the Republic,419 
is similar to Canadian legislation dealing with the prosecution of crimes under the 
ICC.420 
It should be stated at this stage of the study that section 231 of the Constitution 
effectively requires Parliament to approve any possible future repeal of the ICC Act, 
prior to the National Executive sending notice of withdrawal to the Secretary General 
of the United Nations. Repealing legislation is an exclusive function of Parliament, a 
function that cannot be appropriated by the National Executive.421 Similarly a form of 
public participation would be required prior to a decision of this magnitude being made. 
4.7 An analysis of the ICC Act 
The ICC Act provides a framework to ensure the effective implementation of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court in South Africa. The Act further ensures that 
South Africa conforms to its obligations set out in the Statute, providing cooperation 
by South Africa with the Court and assisting with related matters. 
The Preamble to the ICC Act provides an interesting background to the context and 
intention of the legislation. The Preamble of the Act is mindful that: 
 “-Throughout the history of human-kind, millions of children, women and men have suffered as 
a result of atrocities which constitute the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and the crime of aggression in terms of international law; 
 The republic of South Africa, with its own history of atrocities, has, since 1994, become an 
integral and accepted member of the community of nations; 
 The Republic of South Africa is committed to- 
o Bringing persons who commit such atrocities to justice, either in a court of law 
of the Republic in terms of its domestic laws where possible, pursuant to its 
                                                          
417 See Section 39 of the ICC Act which effectively amended aspects of the Criminal Procedure Act No 51 of 
1977 and the Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act 16 of 1999. 
418 See Chapter 4 of the ICC Act, sections 8-32. 
419 Chapter 2, Section 4 (3)(a-d) of the ICC Act. 
420 See Section 8 of the Canadian Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 2000. 
421 Section 231(2) of the Constitution of South Africa. See also discussion in section 1.6.5 above. 
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international obligations to do so when the Republic became a party to the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, or in the event of the 
national prosecuting authority of the Republic declining or being unable to do 
so, in line with the principle of complementarity as contemplated by the 
Statute, in the International Criminal Court, created by and functioning in 
terms of the said Statute; and 
o Carrying out its other obligations in terms of the said Statute….-” 
 
The Preamble states that South Africa has inherited an international obligation under 
the Rome Statute, to bring the perpetrators of crimes against humanity to justice, if 
possible, in a South African court under its domestic law. The Preamble recalls South 
Africa’s own history of atrocities, and welcomes its return to the community of nations, 
once again becoming a member of repute and dignity. This road to international 
acceptance has been a hard and arduous task, driven forward over decades by men 
and women of South Africa, determined that we provide a leading role in promoting 
human rights in the international community. 
The ICC Act seeks to promote, inter alia, the following goals which are recorded in 
section 3 of the Act. The objects stated in the Act are: 
(a) “-To create a framework to ensure that the Rome Statute is effectively implemented in the 
Republic; 
(b) To ensure that anything done in terms of the ICC Act conforms to the Republic’s obligations in 
terms of the Rome Statute; 
(c) To provide for the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; 
(d) To enable South Africa’s National Prosecuting Authority to prosecute and High Courts to 
adjudicate in cases against persons suspected of having committed crimes against humanity, 
both within and outside the borders of South Africa, considering the principle of 
complementarity as referred to in Article 1 of the Rome Statute.  
(e) To cooperate with the ICC with investigations when the National Prosecuting Authority declines 
or is unable to prosecute a person as contemplated in paragraph (d) above.-” 
The ICC Act422 provides that no prosecution may be instituted against a person 
standing accused of having committed a crime, if the specific crime in question is 
alleged to have been committed prior to the commencement of the Statute, which was 
1 July 2002. 
                                                          
422 Section 5(2) of, The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002. 
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While the ICC Act provides South African courts with potential jurisdiction over persons 
who may have committed ICC defined crimes, the issue of immunity from jurisdiction 
for high-ranking officials remains contentious.423 The most debated area has been 
directed at the extent to which serving heads of state, and other senior government 
officials can justifiably claim immunity from proceedings that may be instituted against 
them for allegedly committing defined international crimes. 
4.8 Immunity from proceedings for heads of state and government officials 
The Rome Statute424 provides that: 
“-the official capacity as a head of state or government, a member of a government or 
parliament, an elected representative or a government official, shall in no case exempt a 
person from criminal responsibility under this statute.-” 
The position of international legal immunity before national courts is unclear. In the 
Pinochet Cases,425 the House of Lords accepted that serving international heads of 
state retain absolute immunity, irrespective of the nature of crimes alleged, unless 
waived by the sending state. Initially the House of Lords denied immunity to Pinochet 
in his capacity as a former head of state, but emphasised that if he had still been an 
acting head of state, this immunity in international law would have continued to subsist. 
The International Court of Justice has affirmed this immunity in its decision in the Arrest 
Warrant Case.426 Regarding the provisions precluding immunity contained in 
constitutive instruments of international criminal tribunals, including the Rome Statute 
of the ICC, the Court held that this exception to customary international law was not 
applicable to national courts.427 This lack of clarity is problematic due to the fact that 
national courts of states parties aligned with the Rome Statute are expected to act in 
a “complementary” manner with the ICC. This would include prosecuting individuals 
                                                          
423 Dugard J, International Law: A South African Perspective 210. 
424 Article 27 of the Rome Statute. 
425 Lord Nicholls in the first Pinochet case held that “there can be no doubt that if Senator Pinochet had still 
been the head of the Chilean state, he would have been entitled to immunity.” (see R v Bow St Magistrate, Ex 
p Pinochet Ugarte [1998] 4 All ER (Pinochet 1) at 938. Lord Millett in the third Pinochet case that “Senator 
Pinochet is not a serving head of state. If he were, he could not be extradited. It would be an intolerable 
affront to the Republic of Chile to arrest him or detain him.” (see R v Bow St Magistrate, Ex p Pinochet (no 3) 
[1999] 2 WLR 824, 905H). 
426 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium) 2002 ICJ Reports 3. 
427 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium) 2002 ICJ Reports 3 [58]. 
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for ICC crimes and deferring to the ICC only where the national state is unwilling or 
unable to perform its prosecutorial role. 
South Africa has attempted to avoid this controversy by providing suitable provisions 
in the ICC Act.428 Section 4(2) states that: 
“-Despite any other law to the contrary, including customary and conventional international 
law, the fact that a person- 
(a) Is or was a head of State or government, a member of a government or parliament, an 
elected representative or a government official; or 
(b) Being a member of a security service or armed force, was under a legal obligation to obey 
a manifestly unlawful order of a government or superior: 
Is neither- 
(i) A defence to a crime, nor 
(ii) A ground for any possible reduction of sentence once a person has been convicted 
of a crime.-” 
In terms of the ICC Act, South African courts, acting under the complementarity 
principle, are accorded the same power to override the immunity afforded to officials 
of government, as is the ICC, by virtue of article 27 of the Rome Statute.  
Support for the argument that section 4(2)(a) of the ICC Act scraps immunity, despite 
the contrary position under customary international law, originates from the 
Constitution itself.429 Section 232 of the Constitution provides that “customary 
international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or 
an Act of Parliament.” Similarly section 233 of the Constitution provides that “when 
interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of 
the legislation that is consistent with international law.” 
Cassese430 believes that if under international law, personal immunity attaches to 
serving senior cabinet officials, then not only would the prosecution of such an official 
by South Africa be inconsistent with its obligations under customary international law, 
                                                          
428 Section 4 (2)(a) of the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 
2002. 
429 Dugard J, International Law: A South African Perspective 211. 
430 Cassese A, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002) 992. 
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but the ICC would also be prevented from instituting proceedings against such a 
person or requesting the surrender of that person.431 
In the Arrest Warrant case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held: 
“-The rules governing the jurisdiction of national courts must be carefully distinguished from 
those governing jurisdictional immunities: jurisdiction does not imply absence of immunity, 
while absence of immunity does not imply jurisdiction. Thus, although various international 
conventions on the prevention and punishment of certain serious crimes impose on States 
obligations of prosecution or extradition, thereby requiring them to extend their criminal 
jurisdiction, such extension of jurisdiction in no way affects immunities under international 
law.-”432 
While it is regarded that jurisdictional immunity is procedural by nature, criminal 
responsibility is recognised as a question of substantive law. 
4.9 South African jurisdiction and prosecution under the ICC Act 
The ICC Act has established a variety of jurisdictional bases by which a South African 
court may prosecute a person alleged to be guilty by virtue of genocide, crimes against 
humanity or war crimes.433  
The ICC Act434 creates jurisdiction for a South African court over ICC defined crimes 
by providing that “despite anything to the contrary in any other law of the Republic, 
any person who commits [an ICC] crime, is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction 
to a fine or imprisonment.” 
Section 4(2) of the ICC Act is important because, despite any other law to the contrary, 
being a head of state or a member of government, is no defence to an ICC crime or 
providing grounds for any possible reduction of sentence once a person has been 
convicted of such a crime. 
                                                          
431 See also Tladi D, “The duty on South Africa to Arrest and Surrender Al-Bashir under South African and 
International Law: Attempting to make a Collage from an Incoherent Framework.  DeRebus. 2015. 
432 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, Congo, The Democratic Republic of the v Belgium, Judgement, Merits, 
Preliminary Objections, ICJ GL No 121, [2002] ICJ Rep 3,[2002] ICJ Rep 75, ICGJ (ICJ 2002) 14 February 2002, 
International Court of Justice [ICJ] 59. Also see Akande D, Shah S, “Immunities of State Officials, International 
Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts,” European Journal of International Law, Vol 21, Issue 4, 1 November 
2010, 815-852. (See note 15 and 16 above) 
433 Dugard J, International Law: A South African Perspective 202. 
434 Section 4(1) of The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act No 27 of 
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Section 4(3) of the ICC Act provides for a wider extra-territorial jurisdiction. The 
jurisdiction of a South African court will be confirmed when a person commits an ICC 
crime outside the territory of the Republic, and: 
(a) “-that person is a South African citizen; or 
(b) that person is not a South African citizen, but is ordinarily resident in the Republic; or 
(c) that person, after the commission of the crime, is present in the territory of the Republic; or 
(d) that person has committed the said crime against a South African citizen or against a person 
who is ordinarily resident in the Republic.-” 
Section 4(3) dictates that the crime has been committed within the territory of the 
Republic435 when a person commits a core crime outside the territory of the Republic 
in one of these four circumstances. 
The jurisdictional “triggers” contained within the ICC Act are largely uncontested. 
Section 4(1) of the Act emphasises the traditional principle of territoriality where a state 
has competency in respect of all acts which occur in its territory. Trigger (a) indicates 
that international law has accepted that states have the competency to exercise 
jurisdiction over their citizens for crimes committed anywhere in the world. Trigger (b) 
extends jurisdiction over South African residents by virtue that they have a close and 
substantial connection with South Africa at the time of the offence. Trigger (c) is 
grounded by the concept of universal jurisdiction436 over the perpetrators of crimes 
which are of serious concern to the international community.  Trigger (d) is based on 
the passive personality principle of international law which dictates that a state has the 
competency to exercise jurisdiction over an individual who causes harm to one of its 
nationals abroad. 
The ICC Act provides that a South African court, charged with the prosecution of a 
person allegedly responsible for a core crime, should apply the Constitution and the 
law.437 The South African Bill of Rights438 provides for the rights of arrested, detained 
and accused persons, which would have to be considered for any person being tried 
under the ICC Act. In addition, Part 3 of the Rome Statute sets out a comprehensive 
framework of general principles of liability and defences. 
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4.10 Important features of the ICC Act 
One of the distinct advantages of the Rome Statute of the ICC is that it combines in 
one place, a codified statement of the elements which constitute the crimes of 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.439 The drafters of the ICC Act 
incorporated the ICC Statute’s definitions of the core crimes directly into South African 
law through a schedule appended to the Act.440 In this regard it should be noted that 
Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the ICC Act, follows after the wording of article 6 of the ICC 
Statute in relation to genocide. Part 2 of Schedule 1, reflects article 7 of the Statute 
with regard to crimes against humanity. Part 3 of Schedule 1, incorporates war crimes 
as defined in article 8 of the ICC Statute, which in turn, contains reference to the 
definitions of the Geneva Convention of 1929.441 
It is clearly evident that these crimes now form part of South African law through the 
implementation of the ICC Act. These crimes would also form part of South African 
law via the customary international law provision contained in section 232 of the 
Constitution. One of the objectives of the Act is to provide for the crimes of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.442 It is important to note that section 4(1) of 
the ICC Act, provides that despite any other contrary law in the Republic, any person 
who commits an ICC defined crime, is guilty of an offence 
4.11 Cooperation with the ICC 
Further to empowering South African officials and courts to domestically participate in 
the prosecution of ICC crimes, the ICC Act promotes a comprehensive cooperative 
scheme for South Africa to practice the principle of complementarity.443 
The expectation under the Act, following South Africa’s obligations under the 
complementarity scheme, is that a prosecution will occur within the Republic.444 If the 
National Director declines to prosecute a person in terms of the ICC Act, he or she 
                                                          
439 Du Plessis M, “South Africa’s International Criminal Court Act” Institute for Security Studies paper 172, Nov 
2008, 2. 
440 Schedule 1 Parts 1-3 of The Implementation of the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court (Act No 
27 of 2002). 
441 Geneva Conventions of 1929 reprinted in Roberts and Guelff (n 1) and GNs R749-752 GCE 2064 of 3 May 
1968 (Reg Gaz 953). 
442 Section 39(c) of the ICC Act No 27 of 2002. 
443 Section 5(3) of the ICC Act No 27 of 2002. 
444 Dugard J, International Law: A South African Perspective 204. 
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must provide the Central Authority with full reasons for the decision, and forward these 
to the Registrar of the Court.445 
In terms of arrest and surrender, the ICC Act is based on the understanding that the 
ICC will normally rely on national jurisdiction to secure the custody of suspects.446 As 
a result, the ICC Act envisages two types of arrest; one in terms of an existing warrant 
issued by the ICC, and another in terms of a warrant issued by the South African 
National Department of Public Prosecutions, (NDPP).447 An arrest in terms of an 
existing warrant, issued by the ICC, must comply with the ICC Act.448 This request 
must be referred to the Director-General of Justice and Constitutional Development, 
with the required documentation to satisfy a local court that there are adequate 
grounds for the surrender of the person to The Hague.449 An arrest in terms of a 
warrant issued by the NDPP, follows a request from the ICC for the provisional arrest 
of a person who is suspected or accused of having committed a core ICC crime. The 
director-general must then immediately forward this request to the NDPP, who will 
then apply for an arrest warrant before a magistrate.450 
Having subsequently arrested the individual, the South African authorities proceed to 
surrender and deliver the arrestee to The Hague. In order to make a committal order, 
considering the surrender of an arrestee to the ICC, the magistrate must be satisfied 
that: 
(a) “-he warrant applies to the person in question451 
(b) the person has been arrested in accordance with the procedures laid down by 
domestic law452 
(c) the rights of the person have been respected in terms of Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution to the extent that they are applicable.-”453 
The nature of these three requirements emphasises that surrender to the ICC differs 
from extradition, because no reference is made of the double criminality rule which is 
                                                          
445 Section 5(5) of the ICC Act No 27 of 2002. 
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pivotal to extradition proceedings.454 This rule states that a suspect can be extradited 
from one country to stand trial for breaking a second country’s laws, only when a 
similar law exists in the extraditing country.455 In Patel v NDPP, 456 the court indicated 
that the principle of double (or dual) criminality is internationally recognised as central 
to extradition law. Shearer457 states that the double criminality rule will ensure that a 
person’s liberty is not restricted as a consequence of offences not recognised as 
criminal by the requested state. 
The magistrate must also be satisfied that the ICC has a valid interest in the surrender 
of the arrestee and be content that the person concerned may be surrendered to the 
court: 
(a) “-for the prosecution of the alleged crime 
(b) for the imposition of a sentence by the court in respect of which the person has been convicted 
(c) to serve a sentence already imposed by the court.-”458 
By contrast, the United Kingdom’s ICC Act dictates that a court, when making an order 
for surrender, “is not concerned to enquire whether the warrant was duly issued by the 
ICC or where the person surrendered is alleged to have committed an ICC crime.”459 
Article 89 of the Rome Statute provides that a court may transmit a request for the 
arrest and surrender of a person, together with supporting material, to a State Party, 
in order that this material would be available to the magistrate. 
Article 93 contained in the Rome Statute, requires states parties to assist the ICC by 
cooperating in relation to investigations and prosecutions. Part 2 of the ICC Act 
describes a variety of circumstances in which the relevant authorities in the Republic 
should provide assistance to the ICC in relation to investigations and prosecutions. 
The Priority Crimes Litigation Unit (PCLU) was established to promote these 
obligations.460 
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4.12 The creation of the Priority Crimes Litigation Unit (PCLU) 
In order to promote South Africa’s obligations under the ICC Act, a Priority Crimes 
Litigation Unit (PCLU) was established within the National Prosecuting Authority 
(NPA). This unit is headed by a special director of public prosecutions and appointed 
in terms of the National Prosecuting Authority Act.461 Section 13(1)(c) of the NPA 
provides that the President, after consultation with the Minister and National Director: 
“-may appoint one or more Directors of Public Prosecutions (hereinafter referred to as Special 
Directors) to exercise certain powers, carry out certain duties and perform certain functions 
conferred or imposed or assigned to him or her by the President by proclamation in the 
Gazette.-” 
The Special Director’s appointment was confirmed in terms of Government Gazette 
No 24876 of 23 May 2003.462 The Special Director was given two powers: first, to lead 
the Priority Crimes Litigation Unit; and secondly, to manage and direct the prosecution 
of crimes contemplated in the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Act. The Unit is therefore specifically tasked with dealing with ICC 
crimes as defined in the ICC Act.463 Recently a Directorate for Priority Crimes 
Investigation (DCPI) has been established within the Police service, and the crimes 
under the ICC Act fall within its purview for investigation.464 As a result, any requests 
by individuals or civil society groups for investigation and prosecution under the ICC 
Act, should be directed jointly to the PCLU and DCPI.465 
On the assumption that the PCLU, together with the assistance of the DCPI initiates 
the investigation and issues a warrant of arrest, and the suspects are subsequently 
arrested, the matter will then progresses to the prosecution stage. The ICC Act466 
states that no prosecution may be instituted against a person accused of having 
committed a core crime without the consent of the National Director of Public 
                                                          
461 Section 13(1)(c) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act No 32 of 1998. 
462 Proclamation No 43 of 2003. 
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Prosecutions. Assuming that such consent is provided, the matter will proceed to court 
and the PCLU will adopt responsibility for the prosecution of the matter.467 
4.13 Factors to be considered in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion under 
the ICC Act 
Under the ICC Act the PCLU and the NDPP exercise prosecutorial discretion in 
relation to ICC crimes. Apart from the evidence that is presented to the PCLU and 
NDPP, there are three important factors which are considered in the process by which 
the PCLU and NDPP subsequently decide on whether or not to institute an 
investigation or prosecution under the ICC Act. 
First, the decision to investigate or prosecute must consider the aims of the ICC Act. 
The primary aim of the Act is to secure the prosecution of individuals alleged to be 
guilty of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.468 The Preamble to the 
ICC Act emphasises the obligation imposed on South African authorities under the Act 
is to: 
“ -[bring] persons who commit such atrocities to justice, either in a court of law of the Republic 
in terms of its domestic laws where possible, pursuant to its international obligations to do so 
when the Republic became party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.-” 
It is important to record that one of the objects of the ICC Act469 is to: 
“-Enable, as far as possible and in accordance with the principle of complementarity….. the 
national prosecuting authority of the Republic to prosecute and the High Courts of the 
Republic to adjudicate in cases brought against any person accused of having committed a 
crime in the Republic and beyond the borders of the Republic in certain circumstances.-” 
Second, a decision taken by the national director must consider470 that: 
“-If the National Director, for any reason, declines to prosecute a person under this section, 
he or she must provide the Central Authority with the full reasons for his or her decision and 
the Central Authority must forward that decision, together with the reasons, to the Registrar 
of the Court.-” 
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The Central Authority referred to above, would be the Director-General of the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development.471 
Third, the decision must comply with the NPA Prosecution Policy.472 The primary 
function of the Prosecutor473 is to assist the court in arriving at a just verdict, and in the 
event of a conviction, a fair sentence is imposed based on the presented evidence.  
The NPA has the responsibility and power to institute and conduct criminal 
proceedings on behalf of the State, and to perform the associated functions. The NPA 
Act requires that the Prosecution Policy be tabled in Parliament and that the United 
Nations Guidelines of the Role of Prosecutors be observed.474 This document instructs 
Prosecutors to give due attention to the prosecution of crimes committed by public 
officials, particularly corruption, abuse of power, grave violations of human rights and 
other crimes recognised by international law.475 This consideration has been 
recognised by the South African government which then created a Priority Crimes 
Litigation Unit to ensure that crimes committed under the ICC Act are prioritised and 
prosecuted. 
The Prosecution Policy476 indicates that once a Prosecutor is satisfied that there is 
adequate evidence to provide a reasonable prospect of conviction, a prosecution 
should generally follow, unless the public interest demands otherwise. When deciding 
what is in the public interest, an important consideration should be the gravity of 
crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, as defined by the 
ICC. The Constitutional Court in S v Basson,477 expressed the following opinion in this 
regard: 
“- As was pointed out at Nuremberg, crimes against international law are committed by 
people, not by abstract entities, so that only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes 
                                                          
471 Du Plessis M, “South Africa’s International Criminal Court Act countering genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.” (2008) Institute for Security Studies Paper 12. 
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can the provisions of international law be enforced.478 Given the nature of the charges, the 
SCA should have given appropriate weight and attention to these considerations, even in the 
absence of any argument on these issues by the state. Given the extreme gravity of the 
charges and the powerful and international need to have these issues properly adjudicated, 
particularly in the light of the international consensus on the normative desirability of 
prosecuting war criminals, only the most compelling reasons would have justified the SCA in 
exercising its discretion to refuse to rule on the charges.-” 
South Africa’s interest in not becoming a safe haven for the perpetrators of crimes 
against international law, should form part of the overall consideration of “public 
interest” in prosecuting such crimes. 
4.14 Prosecution and the NDPP’s consent 
The ICC Act promotes the concept of complementarity by creating the necessary 
structure for national prosecutions under the ICC Statute. 
The ICC Act479 provides that no prosecution may be instituted against a person 
accused of having committed a crime without the consent of the National Director [of 
Public Prosecutions]. The national director must, when reaching a decision regarding 
a prosecution, recognise South Africa’s obligation to the principle of complementarity 
under the Rome Statute. This includes the exercise of jurisdiction to prosecute persons 
accused of having committed an ICC crime.480  
Considering the importance of a prosecution involving allegations against an accused 
of having perpetrated ICC defined crimes, the ICC Act provides that a specialised court 
would need to be designated.481 
The ICC Act does not provide for any specific trial procedure or punishment regime 
for domestic courts. What the ICC Act does provide, is for the designation of an 
appropriate High Court in which to conduct a prosecution against any person accused 
of committing an ICC crime.482  
                                                          
478 Trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Vol 22 (1948) (the 
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480 Section 5(3) of the ICC Act No 27 of 2002. 
481 Section 5(4) of the ICC Act No 27 of 2002. 
482 Section 5(4) of the ICC Act No 27 of 2002. 
 
80 
 
The expectation under the ICC Act, considering South Africa’s obligations under the 
complementarity principle, is that a prosecution would take place within the Republic. 
This is consistent with the spirit of cooperation and intent evident in the Preamble of 
the ICC Act, which promotes compliance with its obligations to the Rome Statute.  
In this context, the existing confrontational relationship that exists between the African 
Union (AU), the ICC and the United Nations Security Council, should now be 
considered in the interests of all the citizens of Africa and their inherent human rights, 
dignity and economic freedom. 
4.15 Conclusion 
South Africa’s ratification of the Rome Statute, followed by the enactment of the ICC 
Act, illustrates that the Republic is responding to international demand for a stand 
against ICC defined crimes. South Africa’s role as an African leader in its continued 
support for the ICC, is vital to the Court’s work and legitimacy on the continent. 
 
CHAPTER 5  The relationship between African Union and the ICC 
5.1 Introduction 
Of the 124 countries in the world that are States Parties to the Rome Statute, 34 are 
African States. The African Union (AU) Member States were instrumental in the 
development of the Rome Statute and the subsequent formation of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). Senegal was the first state to ratify the Rome Statute.483 Uganda 
referred the first case to the ICC, which currently has 10 cases under investigation, 
nine of which are African countries.484 
Central to the relationship between the AU and the ICC is the United Nations Security 
Council. The AU has called for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security 
Council in order to make the Security Council (SC) more representative and legitimate 
by including African states in the power balance within the SC.485 This proposal was 
                                                          
483 United Nations. 1999. Senegal first State to ratify Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Press 
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originally built on the Sirte Declaration,486 calling for the allocation of two permanent 
seats to Africa along with veto powers, including five non-permanent seats.487 
5.2 An analysis of the existing relationship between the African Union and the 
ICC 
The Security Council is central to the history of the confrontational relationship 
between the AU and the ICC. This relationship exists not only because the SC initiated 
the process leading to the issuing of an arrest warrant against President Bashir, but 
because the SC holds the power to defer proceedings against Bashir under article 16 
of the Statute.488 The AU Peace and the Security Council (PSC) responded with the 
view that in order to promote long-lasting peace, it was important that the search for 
justice should be pursued in a way that does not impede or jeopardise efforts aimed 
at promoting lasting peace.489 In addition, the PSC was concerned that the ICC arrest 
warrant may be an indication of double standards and may amount to a misuse of 
indictments against African leaders.490 The PSC then called on the SC, in terms of 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, to defer the process against Bashir in order 
that ongoing peace initiatives in Sudan would not be jeopardised, as well as the fact 
that in the current situation, a prosecution may not be in the best interests of victims 
and justice.491 
By the time that the AU Heads of State and Government met in Addis Ababa in 
February 2009, the SC had not acted on the PSC’s request.492 The Summit 
subsequently endorsed the call made by the PSC for an Article 16 deferral by the SC. 
The PSC also cautioned that the indictment would undermine the fragile peace 
process that was underway in The Sudan, whilst expressing the AU’s resolute 
                                                          
486 The Sirte Declaration, a resolution originally adopted by the AU on 9 September 1999 at the fourth 
Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly held in Sirte, Libya. This Declaration was followed by a summit in 
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commitment to combating impunity.493 The Summit also took the unprecedented step 
by requesting the AU Commission to: 
“-convene as early as possible, a meeting of African countries that are parties to the Rome 
Statute on the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to exchange views on 
the work of the ICC in relation to Africa, in particular in the light of the processes initiated 
against African personalities, and to submit recommendations thereon taking into account all 
relevant elements.-”494  
The step was unprecedented because, while the AU Assembly has broad competence 
under article 9 of the AU Constitutive Act, including competence to determine common 
policies of the Union, it appeared irregular for the AU to convene a meeting of states 
parties to a treaty that the AU is not itself a party. 495 Subsequently, the AU 
Commission called a meeting in June 2009 of the Ministers of Justice of African States 
Parties to the ICC Statute. During that meeting in Addis Ababa, several African state 
parties called for the withdrawal of ICC support, while others defended the ICC against 
attack. The outcome of the meeting contained two sets of recommendations. The first 
set reiterated the AU’s unflinching commitment to combating impunity, as well as the 
call for an article 16 deferral by the Security Council.496 The second set, included 
proposals that the AU should decide that all member states withdraw from the ICC 
statute, or refuse to cooperate with the Bashir indictment. The main element of this 
recommendation, on which there was no consensus, stated that: 
“-In view of the fact that the Article 16 request by the AU has never been acted upon, the AU 
Member States shall not cooperate pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 of the Rome 
Statute of the ICC relating to immunities, for the arrest and surrender of President Omar al 
Bashir of The Sudan.-”497 
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One could conclude, in the light of the above recommendation, that the AU’s objection 
to the execution of the arrest warrant against Al Bashir, is based on the concern that 
such action would threaten the current peace process in The Sudan. The underlying 
reason could be the notion that the ICC, as a perceived western institution, should not 
exercise jurisdiction over African leaders. The arrest warrant for an African head of 
state was also considered an example of imperialist arrogance, and the concept 
emerged that African leaders should not to be tried under non-African systems.498 The 
decision by the AU, warns that it reserves the right to take any subsequent decision   
to protect the dignity and sovereignty of the continent, implying that all the African 
states could withdraw from the ICC. 
The attitude of the AU could be interpreted as questioning the validity of the new value-
based system of international law, which is reflected in the ICC Statute.499 
Notwithstanding the AU’s concerns, the ICC pre-trial chamber (PTC) resolved to issue 
an arrest warrant for al-Bashir on 4 March 2009. This prompted the PSC to 
immediately issue a further communique expressing concern as to the timing of the 
arrest warrant, confirming its concern that the ICC process would undermine ongoing 
efforts to achieve peace and security in The Sudan.500  
It is important to consider that the Sirte Resolution501 was considered by Botswana a 
violation of the Rome Statute and a betrayal of Africa’s dedication to terminate 
impunity for human rights violations.502 Within the AU, the Sirte Resolution was not 
wholeheartedly welcomed. Botswana, once again, distanced itself from the Resolution 
and reaffirmed its position as a State Party to the Rome Statute of the ICC, and fully 
agreed to cooperate with the ICC in the arrest and transfer of the President of Sudan 
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to the ICC.503 At this stage, South Africa clarified its position, confirming that it would 
cooperate with the ICC in the investigation and prosecution of crimes and the 
subsequent execution of ICC arrest warrants.504 
The AU confirmed its position of non-cooperation regarding al-Bashir’s arrest warrant 
at its summit on 22 July 2010, where the following remarks were made by the AU 
Chairperson and Malawian President, Bingu wa Mutharika: 
“-To subject a sovereign head of state to a warrant of arrest is undermining African 
solidarity and African peace and security that we fought for so many years. There is 
general concern in Africa that the issuance of a warrant of arrest for al-Bashir, a duly 
elected president, is a violation of the principle of sovereignty guaranteed under the United 
Nations and African Union Charter.-” 
During 2010, President al-Bashir travelled to Chad, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo without being detained.505 It is important also to 
consider that thirty-three of the fifty-three member states of the AU are party to the 
Rome Statute. This statistic places considerable pressure on the argument that the 
values represented by the ICC of intolerance against impunity, and the subsequent 
indictment of al-Bashir, are being imposed on African states by Western states. It is 
clear that many African states such as Botswana, were uncomfortable with the AU 
decision, suggesting that possibly the Africans felt a sense of commitment to those 
values supporting the ICC, including the arrest warrant issued against al-Bashir.506 
Pierre-Marie Dupuy507 stated that the time had come to accept that the values under 
consideration are not restricted to European heritage, but constitute the common 
heritage of mankind, including Africa.  Tladi reminds us as well, “that to fight against 
impunity and the concern for the well-being of the most vulnerable, are values central 
to humanity irrespective of geography. Arguments to the contrary attempt to blind us 
from this truth.”508 
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5.3 The African situations before the International Criminal Court 
It is important to remember that there are three ways in which the ICC can initiate 
action: at the request of a State Party to the founding Rome Statute: at the request of 
the UN Security Council, and when the Court’s prosecutor comes to the conclusion 
that a “situation” exists in a State Party indicating that its leaders or citizens have 
committed genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.509  
Three parties to the Rome Statute have referred situations occurring on their territories 
to the ICC: the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic and 
Uganda. In addition, the Security Council has referred the situations in Sudan and 
Libya to the Court, both of which have not ratified the Rome Statute.510 On 31 March 
2010, the Prosecutor was granted authorisation by the Pre-Trial Chamber II to initiate 
an investigation proprio motu into the situation in Kenya.511 The Court also considered 
violations in Cote d’Ivoire, which has not ratified the Rome Statute, but has made a 
declaration in accordance with article 12(3), which permits a non-state party to submit 
a declaration with the Registrar of the Court accepting the Court’s jurisdiction for these 
specific crimes.512 
5.3.1 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
In March 2004, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) referred 
the situation of grave crimes allegedly committed on the territory of the DRC to the 
International Criminal Court. The DRC requested the Prosecutor to investigate 
whether crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction had been committed within its territory 
since the entry into force of the Rome Statute.513 After thoroughly investigating the 
referral by the DRC, the Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo decided to open the first 
ICC investigation. He decided to concentrate the investigations on the perpetrators 
most responsible for crimes committed under the jurisdiction of the ICC, within the Ituri 
region of Northeast DRC. The first arrest warrant of the ICC was announced on 17 
March 2006, which called for the arrest of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the leader of the 
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Patriotic Forces of Resistance (PFR), a political and military movement in Ituri 
province. In 2006 Lubanga was arrested and transferred to The Hague, where his trial 
commenced on 26 January 2009. Arrest warrants were issued for another four 
Congolese military leaders, including Germain Katanga, a senior commander in the 
PFR, for various war crimes and crimes against humanity.514 
Critics of this process believe that the insignificant players in Ituri province have been 
indicted by the ICC and placed on trial in The Hague. They believe that the Prosecutor 
deliberately left the most important actors, the national political and military leaders in 
the DRC in the shadows, including neighbouring Uganda and Rwanda, who provided  
militias with critical support. The Court has thus been unable to place the crimes in 
their full historical and regional context, and is not effectively uncovering the truth.515 
Germain Katanga was convicted by the ICC in March 2014 of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity during an attack against the Bogoro village in Ituri, Northeast DRC, 
and was sentenced to twelve years in prison.516 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was convicted in March 2012 of war crimes. Sentenced to 15 
years’ imprisonment, which was confirmed upon appeal. Reparations pending. 
5.3.2 Uganda 
In December 2003, the Ugandan government referred the situation in its country to the 
Prosecutor of the ICC and an investigation was initiated in July 2004. The investigation 
has centred on northern Uganda, where a number of atrocities, including crimes 
against humanity and war crimes have been committed against the civilian population. 
In July 2005 the Court issued arrest warrants for five senior commanders of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA).517 
Dominic Ongwen was charged with 70 counts of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity in Northern Uganda. The trial of this LRA commander opened on 6 
December 2016. He is the first LRA commander to appear before the ICC. 
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A warrant of arrest for Joseph Kony on twelve counts of crimes against humanity and 
twenty-one counts of war crimes was issued on 8 July 2005.518 Joseph Kony is 
currently not in ICC custody. 
5.3.3 Central African Republic 
In December 2004, the government of the Central African Republic (CAR) referred the 
situation within the CAR to the Prosecutor of the ICC. This was the third referral 
submitted by a State Party in terms of the Rome Statute.519 The Prosecutor 
subsequently decided to investigate the situation in May 2007. The situation in the 
CAR had been distinctive for the high number of sexually related crimes, which in the 
case of the CAR, has exceeded the number of alleged killings.520  
The first suspect arrested in relation to this investigation was Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, president and commander-in-chief of the Movement for the Liberation of 
Congo. He was allegedly responsible, as a military commander, for the commission of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity in the CAR. Bemba was arrested by Belgian 
authorities on 24 May 2008 and transferred to a detention centre in The Hague on 3 
July 2008.521 His trial commenced on 22 November 2010, and he was convicted by 
the ICC in 2016 for war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated in the CAR. 
He was sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment. Reparations are pending.522 
 
 
5.3.4 Kenya 
On 26 November 2009, the Prosecutor used his proprio motu powers contained in the 
Rome Statute for the first time.523 Authorisation was sought from Pre-Trial Chamber II 
to open an investigation in relation to crimes allegedly committed during the 2007-
2008 post-election violence in Kenya.524 On 8 March 2011, following extensive 
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investigations, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II issued a summons for six suspects, including 
senior politicians and government officials associated with both sides of the election 
violence.525 The suspects appeared before the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II on 7 April 
2011, where the Confirmation of Charges hearing was scheduled for 1 September 
2011. However, on 31 March 2011, the Chamber received an application on behalf of 
the Government of Kenya, where on the basis of article 19 of the Rome Statute of the 
ICC, that the Chamber found the case against three of the indicted persons 
inadmissible.526 This request was based on the contention that Kenya was able to 
conduct its own prosecutions for the post-election violence, because it had adopted a 
new Constitution and other legal reforms.527 Kenya’s political elite responded 
aggressively to the ICC’s indictments, and on 22 December 2010, Kenya’s Parliament 
passed a resolution calling for Kenya to withdraw from the Rome Statute.528  
The incumbent president of Kenya, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta initially appeared before 
the ICC on 8 April 2011 charged of being criminally responsible as an indirect co-
perpetrator pursuant to article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute for crimes against 
humanity.529 The charges were dismissed on a technicality on 5 December 2014. 
The ICC trial of Kenyan politician William Ruto and broadcaster Joshua Sang in 2016, 
was terminated due to insufficient evidence and alleged witness-tampering. They had 
initially been charged with crimes against humanity during the post-election violence 
that had occurred in Kenya during 2007-8. 
5.3.5 Libya 
On 26 February 2011 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1970 
(2011) referring the situation in Libya to the ICC. Libya was not a state party to the 
Rome Statute. The Resolution resolved to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya to the Prosecutor of the ICC and compelled Libya to cooperate fully with 
the ICC, despite it’s not being a party to the Rome Statute. Following an analysis of 
the situation, the Prosecutor, on 16 May 2011, applied to the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I 
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for arrest warrants against Libyan leader Moammar al-Gaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam 
al-Gaddafi, the Libyan government spokesman, and Abdulla al-Sanusi, head of Libyan 
intelligence, for crimes against humanity. In the aftermath of a rebel victory, opposition 
forces captured and executed Moammar Gadaffi on 20 October 2011, thus terminating 
investigations against him.530 The cases of Saif al-Islam Gadaffi and Abdulla Senussi 
have remained in contention. The National Transitional Council (NTC), the temporary 
body of Libya, has appealed the admissibility of ICC jurisdiction in the cases against 
Gadaffi and Senussi in the ICC’c Pre-Trial Chamber. On 11 October 2013, the Pre-
Trial Chamber judges at the ICC issued their determination that the case of Abdulla 
al-Senussi was inadmissible before the court.531 The Libyan government has, in other 
words, proved that they are willing and able to pursue an investigation against Senussi 
and the ICC terminated its investigation. In the case of Saif al-Islam Gadaffi, the Pre-
Trial Chamber judges ruled that the Libyan government had not satisfied the 
requirements necessary to rule the case inadmissible before a court. Saif al-Islam 
Gadaffi has been held, without trial, by a militia group, known as the Abu Baker al-
Siddiq Brigade, in the town of Zintan since his capture which occurred in November 
2011. The ICC has since argued that the Libyan government is either incapable or 
unwilling to submit Saif al-Islam Gadaffi for trial, or is not willing to incur the political 
and monetary costs of forcing the Zintan militia to hand him over to the central 
authority.532 
On 9 November 2016, Fatou Bensouda, the ICC Prosecutor, indicated in an address 
to the UNSC, that Saif al-Islam Gadaffi had been released from detention in Zintan 
and was beyond the custody and control of the Presidency Council of the Government 
of National Accord. Bensouda appealed to the Libyan authorities to have Gadaffi 
transferred to the ICC without further delay.533 
In April 2017, the ICC unsealed a separate arrest warrant534 issued in 2013 for the 
former head of Moammar Gadaffi’s Internal Security Agency, Mohamed Khaled Al-
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Tuhamy, for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Libya between 
February-August 2011. His current whereabouts remain unknown. 
5.3.6 Sudan 
On 31 March 2005, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1593,535 referring the 
prosecution of those allegedly responsible for several atrocities committed in the 
Darfur region in Sudan to the ICC.536 Subsequently, on 4 March 2009, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, issued the warrant of arrest against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir 
for alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes.537 The Sudan referral has 
highlighted several contentious issues in international law. Firstly, it is the first time 
that a presiding president has been investigated for international crimes before the 
ICC.538 This investigation was facilitated by the Rome Statute,539 providing that 
functional immunity does not apply to any specific individual before the ICC, making 
particular reference to heads of state and government.540  
Since Sudan is not party to the Rome Statute, questions have arisen concerning head 
of state immunity under customary international law, and the extent to which the Rome 
Statute’s provisions eliminate that immunity, as applied to President al-Bashir.541 
These provisions have also generated further debate over the appropriate relationship 
between articles 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute. Article 98 provides that a state is not 
obliged to hand over an individual to the ICC, if doing so would be inconsistent with its 
obligations under international law with respect to State or diplomatic immunity.542 This 
is largely the argument forwarded by the South African government for its failure to 
arrest President al-Bashir, which has completely ignored the spirit and intent of article 
27 of the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 
                                                          
535 UN Security Council Resolution 1593, 31 March 2005. 
536 Dugard J, International Law: A South African Perspective 197. 
537 Warrant of Arrest for Omar al-Bashir, No ICC-02/05-01/09 (4 March 2009). 
538 Williams S, and Sherif L, “The arrest warrant for President al-Bashir: Immunities of incumbent heads of state 
and International Criminal Court.” (2009) 14 Journal of Conflict and Security law at 71. 
539 Article 27(1) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
540 Du Plessis M, and Gevers C, “Making amendments: South Africa and the International Criminal court from 
2009-2010 (2009) 34 SAYIL at 22. 
541 Akande D, and Shah S, “Immunities of state officials, international crimes and foreign domestic courts.” 
(2010) 21 (4) European Journal of International Law at 815. 
542 Dugard J, “Regarding the relationship between article 98 and 27 of the Rome Statute; South Africa appears 
to have taken the robust position that, notwithstanding the fact that Sudan is not a state party to the Rome 
Statute, al-Bashir does not have an entitlement to immunity under article 27 of the Rome Statute” at 198. 
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27 of 2002. These events precipitated South Africa’s misguided notice of withdrawal 
from the ICC which will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.543 
On 6 July 2017 Judge Tarfusser of the ICC handed down judgement on South Africa’s 
failure to arrest President al-Bashir when he visited the Republic in June 2015.544 He 
stated that, “the Chamber concludes that by not arresting Omar al-Bashir while in 
South Africa between 13-15 June 2015, South Africa failed to comply with the court’s 
request for the arrest and surrender of al-Bashir, contrary to the provisions of the 
[Rome] Statute.”545 South Africa was given five days to appeal the ruling. 
It would appear that the inherent flaw of the ICC is that it does not enjoy universal 
jurisdiction, particularly in Africa, without which there can be no individual enforcement. 
5.3.7 Other African ICC trials 
Former Cote d’Ivoire president Laurent Gbagbo and youth leader Charles Ble Goude 
have been charged with crimes against humanity following the 2010 presidential 
elections. Their joint ICC trial opened in January 2016. It was noted that local public 
opinion indicated that the ICC needed to carry out their mandate “in a manner 
designed to ensure that the ICC’s delivery of justice will be accessible, meaningful, 
and perceived as legitimate, having an impact in countries where it conducts 
investigations.”546 
On 27 September 2016, an ICC Court sentenced Islamic militant, Ahmed al-Faqi al-
Mahdi to nine years imprisonment for intentionally directing attacks against historical 
monuments in Timbuktu, Mali.547 
 
                                                          
543 South African Justice and Correctional Services Minister, Michael Masutha announced the government’s 
intention to withdraw from the ICC, and notice was given to the United Nations Secretary General on 17 
October, 2016. 
544 Failure to arrest President al-Bashir was inconsistent with South Africa’s obligations in terms of the Rome 
Statute and section 10 of The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 
2002. 
545 Eyewitness News “ICC: SA violated ICC Agreement when it failed to arrest al-Bashir.” 6 July 2017 (Accessed 
by ewn.co.za on 16 July 2017). 
546 Human Rights Watch 2014 “Lessons from the ICC’s Work in Cote d’Ivoire” www.hrw.org/report/2015/08/04  
(Accessed 16 July 2017). ICC-02/11-01/15. 
547 The Guardian “ICC Ruling for Timbuktu destruction should be a deterrent for others.” (2016) www.the 
guardian.com/world/2016 (Accessed on 16 July 2017) 
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5.4 South Africa’s role in promoting an ongoing relationship with the ICC in 
Africa 
The Chief Justice of the Republic of South Africa, Mogoeng Mogoeng, in his address 
to African Legal Aid (AFLA)548 quoted a former Secretary General of the United 
Nations, Mr Kofi Atta Annan: 
“-On a continent that has experienced deadly conflict, gross violation of human rights, even 
genocide, I am surprised to hear critics ask whether the pursuit of justice might obstruct 
the search for peace. We must be ambitious enough to pursue both.-” 
The Chief Justice continued to stress that Africa and the world needed the ICC 
yesterday, today and forever. He indicated that dialogue with Africa is crucial to 
address the strained relationship that exists between Africa and the ICC, and referred 
to the sentiments of the former President of the Republic of South Africa, Nelson 
Mandela, who stated: 
“Our own continent has suffered enough horrors emanating from the inhumanity of human 
beings towards human beings. Who knows, many of these might not have occurred, or at 
least been minimised, had there been an effectively functioning ICC.”549 
These three eminent jurists and statesmen all advocated the important role of the ICC 
in Africa. South Africa has in the past played a leading role in promoting the ICC in 
Africa which has previously seen the support of the AU.550 To confirm its power to 
recognise and implement the provisions of international instruments, section 231 was 
tabled which provides that any international agreement becomes law in the Republic 
of South Africa when it is enacted into law by national legislation.551 In order to give 
effect to its obligations under the Rome Statute and to provide a leading example to 
the rest of Africa, South Africa enacted the Implementation of the Rome Statute 
Criminal Court Act.552 
                                                          
548 Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng “Africa and the International Criminal Court (ICC)-Lessons Learned and 
Synergies ahead,” Address to African Legal Aid, Johannesburg, South Africa, 9 September 2014. 
549 Address delivered by former President Nelson Mandela at the Conference of African National Institutions 
for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Durban, 01 July 1998. 
550 Article 4 of the African Union Constitutive Act affirms the continent’s commitment to the protection and 
promotion of human rights and the rejection of impunity. 
551 Section 231 of the Constitution of South Africa 1996. 
552 The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002. 
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But has South Africa continued to enact the wishes of its senior citizens such as 
Nelson Mandela and the Chief Justice? Does it still promote a favourable relationship 
between Africa and the ICC? 
South Africa has over the years styled itself as a bridge between the western world 
and Africa, promoting the concept that the Republic served as the “gateway to Africa.” 
It perceives itself as a spokesperson for the continent, considering its membership of 
the BRICS alliance,553 and G20.554 
But how do Africans beyond South Africa’s borders view the country? The widespread 
attacks on foreigners in South Africa in 2008 is perceived as an indication that South 
Africans do not view themselves as part of the continent and resented the immigrants 
from the rest of Africa. Over 75% of immigrants to South Africa come from Africa, with 
1,5 million coming from Zimbabwe and over a third of Malawi’s population live and 
work in South Africa.555 
There is also a growing lack of trust in South Africa’s bona fides. The country lays 
claim to represent the continent in BRICS and the G20, but there is a feeling that very 
little benefit filters through to the rest of the continent. South Africa’s own economic 
interests appear to enjoy priority, despite its rhetoric of ubuntu556 relating to human 
kindness and consideration. 
These negative perceptions of South Africa’s leadership role in the continent have spilt 
over and damaged its relationship with the AU, the ICC and African citizens. Its 
credibility has diminished, especially with the influence of growing corruption in 
government and several setbacks in the High Court regarding its membership of the 
ICC.557  
Several serious questions could be asked of the South African Government’s lack of 
commitment and resolve to the AU, and various agreements negotiated by South 
                                                          
553 An alliance of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 
554 The G20 is an international forum for governments and central bank governors from 20 major economies, 
formed in 2008, seeking to promote international financial stability. 
555 https:// africacheck.org/factsheets/geo (Accessed 17 July 2017) 
556 Ubuntu is an African quality that includes the essential human virtues of compassion, understanding and 
humanity. 
557 South Africa officially withdrew its notice of withdrawal from the ICC following a court order that found the 
notice to be unconstitutional. The Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation 
and Others (83145/2016)[2017]ZAGPPHC 53; 2017(3) SA 212 (GP); 2017. 
94 
 
Africa under the auspices of the AU.558 Why is it that these agreements are not made 
binding law in South Africa in terms of section 231(4) of the Constitution?559 Could it 
be that South Africa purposely decided to give domestic preference to the UN and to 
international agreements, such as the Rome Statute, perhaps in a bid to impress 
Western powers and gain their favour? 
Some serious questions must be directed at the South African Government’s legal 
advisors, and their failure to foresee the legal problems resulting from the Republic’s 
government not domesticating AU agreements, but doing so with the Rome Statute.560 
This has caused the South African government considerable reputational damage on 
the continent, and indeed across the rest of the world. Internationally, the failure to 
arrest President al-Bashir and the announcement of South Africa’s intention to 
withdraw from the Rome Statute has done considerable damage to the country’s 
reputation. Angela Mudukuti561 believes that this former champion of international 
justice has fallen from grace.  
Post-apartheid South Africa proclaims itself to be a constitutional democracy seeking 
to uphold the rule of law and provide an example to the rest of Africa. This failure to 
arrest al-Bashir and its initial intention to abandon the only available permanent 
mechanism for international accountability, could not be further at variance.  
The al-Bashir case and the intended withdrawal from the ICC also highlight the 
intersection between politics and law. Whilst the law does not operate in isolation, it 
should not be influenced by political considerations that favour one leader or political 
party. Justice, accountability and the promotion of human rights within the ambit of the 
ICC, should be far higher on the government’s list of priorities than political 
expedience. 
                                                          
558 For example, the development of the BRICS Alliance (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and 
holding the first BRICS Summit in Durban in March 2013, and agreeing to establish the New Development Bank 
(NDB) African Regional Centre in South Africa, for the benefit of African states and the AU.  
559 For example South Africa’s position on the implementation of the AU Agenda 2063 currently under 
consideration. Department of Home Affairs November 2017. 
560 For example The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) promoting socioeconomic 
development in Africa, containing principles designed to be incorporated in participating countries domestic 
law. 
561 Mudukuti A, “Prioritising Justice and Accountability in South Africa.” Perspectives and political analyses in 
Africa Issue 1 January 2017. 
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On 14 March 2017, the South African Minister of Justice, formally withdrew the draft 
repeal legislation on the withdrawal of the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Bill.562 This followed a High Court ruling that the 
government’s decision to withdraw from the ICC was unconstitutional and invalid.563 
The South African Law Commission (SALC) had also forwarded submissions to the 
Portfolio Committee on Justice and Correctional Services recommending the 
scrapping of the Repeal Bill in its entirety.564 Could this be the start of a rebuilding 
process for South Africa’s support for the ICC? This provides a significant 
demonstration to Africa, that following a period of political uncertainty, it continues to 
provide unconditional support for international law. 
 Whilst considering these promising developments, it is important to understand the 
entire Omar al-Bashir affair in context, resulting in the circumstances leading up to 
South Africa’s notice of withdrawal from the ICC. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The ICC’s impact in affected communities in Africa is not immediately clear, but it is 
clear that the delivery of justice matters. Not only is the quality of justice important, but 
in Africa justice must be seen to be done. This is a fundamental aspect of indigenous 
law in this region, where a signal must be sent that no person is above the law. This 
provides a powerful affirmation of the rule of law, but only when that message is heard 
and understood by those victimised by criminality. 
The message that South Africa gave to the AU following the withdrawal of its intention 
to leave the ICC, may strengthen the existing relationship between the ICC and the 
AU, as the AU begins to understand that the preservation of human rights is an issue 
gathering huge momentum on the continent. 
 
 
                                                          
562 The Minister of Justice and Correctional Services withdrew the Repeal Bill in accordance with Rule 334 of 
the Rules of the National Assembly. 
563 See note 544 above. (This will be further discussed in Chapter 7 below) 
564 Southern African Litigation Centre. News Release, “Withdrawal of the ICC Repeal Bill” 16 March 2017.  
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CHAPTER 6 The al Bashir affair and circumstances leading to South Africa’s 
notice of withdrawal from the ICC 
6.1 Introduction 
The circumstances leading up to South Africa’s notification of withdrawal from the ICC 
revolve around African Union (AU) opinions, its decisions and the ICC’s indictment of 
President Omar al-Bashir. 
On 3 July 2009, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted a 
decision on the ICC indictment of the President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir. This 
decision indicated that African states would refuse to cooperate with the ICC in the 
execution of the arrest warrant issued for President al-Bashir.565 This decision placed 
the African states party to the Rome Statute establishing the ICC, in the unenviable 
position of having to choose between their responsibilities as member states of the 
AU, and their obligations as states party to the Rome Statute.566 
It is important to recall that the history of the ICC’s creation involved the active support 
of African states. Since the Rome Statute came into operation on 1 July 2002, it has 
been signed by 139 states and ratified by 113, of which 31 are African.567 Africa is also 
the largest grouping on the Assembly of States Parties (ASP), and the ICC in The 
Hague employs staff from across the world including five judges from Africa. 
6.2 Factors surrounding the arrival of President Omar Al-Bashir in South Africa 
African states contributed extensively to the preparations leading up to the conference 
in Rome, where the Rome Statute was finalised. Prior to this conference, various ICC 
related activities were organised throughout Africa, which was consistent with the 
concept of enhancing universal support for the ICC.568 Some 90 African 
organisations569 lobbied their respective countries for the early establishment of an 
independent and effective international criminal court.570 
                                                          
565 AU Summit Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), Assembly/AU/Dec245(XIII), July 2009. 
566 Tladi D, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court (2009) SAYIL 34. 
567 Dugard J, International Law: A South African Perspective 173. 
568 Phakiso Mochochoko, Africa and the International Criminal Court, in E Ankumah and E Kwakwa (eds), 
African perspectives on international criminal justice, Ghana: Africa Legal Aid, 2005,246. 
569 Based in Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia. 
570 Du Plessis M, “The International Criminal Court that Africa wants” Institute for Security Studies 6. 
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The Southern African Development Community (SADC) also played an important role 
in its support for the ICC. During ICC-related negotiations, after which the International 
Law Commission (ILC) presented a draft statute for an international criminal court to 
the UN General Assembly in 1993, experts originating from the group met in Pretoria 
during September 1997 to discuss their common position. Based on discussions and 
principles submitted to them, the SADC ministers of justice and attorneys-general 
issued a common statement that subsequently became the primary basis for SADC’s 
negotiations in Rome.571 
At a meeting on 27 February 1998, council members of the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU), (now the African Union, AU) acknowledged the Dakar declaration572 and 
requested all OAU member states to support the development of the ICC. This 
resolution was subsequently adopted by the OAU summit of heads of state and 
government in Burkina Faso in June 1998. 
During the Rome Conference itself South Africa was a member of the drafting 
committee and coordinated the formation of part 4 of the Rome Statute. Schabas573 
noted at the Rome conference: 
“-[a] relatively new force, the Southern African Development Community, under the dynamic 
influence of post-apartheid South Africa, took important positions on human rights, providing 
a valuable counter-weight to the Europeans in this field.-” 
It is submitted that there is no doubt that African states had ample opportunity to 
ensure that the principles contained in the SADC and Dakar Declarations were 
implemented to the fullest extent possible. 
In order to give effect to its complementarity obligations under the Rome Statute, 
South Africa passed the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Act,574 and was the first state in Africa to implement the Rome Statute’s 
provisions into its domestic law. 
The picture that emerges is that of an international criminal court created with 
extensive involvement of African nations. The measure of this African support for the 
                                                          
571 Maqungo S, The establishment of the International Criminal Court: SADC’s participation in the negotiations. 
African Security Review 9(1) (2000). 
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ICC is clearly evident from the response by leading African nations to American efforts, 
post-1998 to undermine the development of the ICC. During President Bill Clinton’s 
final days in office, the United States signed the ICC statute, but was unable to secure 
ratification of the treaty before President Bush came to power. Once established in 
office, the Bush administration advised the UN Secretary General on 6 May 2002, that 
the United States had no intention of becoming a party to the Rome Statute.575 The 
United States then resorted to diplomatic means to oppose the ICC. The United States 
method was to encourage states to enter into bilateral immunity agreements, whereby 
states agreed not to send US citizens for trial at the ICC. Over 60 countries signed 
these agreements under pressure from the United States, but several African states, 
including Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania refused to sign. 
In the case of South Africa, the United States had imposed a deadline of 30 June 2003 
to sign the agreement. Having refused to submit to US demands by the stated 
deadline, South Africa was blacklisted on 1 July 2003.576 According to the US embassy 
in Pretoria, South Africa’s decision would cost it about 7,2 million dollars in military 
aid.577 The South African government’s reason for taking this position was based on 
the country’s commitment to the humanitarian objectives of the ICC and the country’s 
international obligations. 
The strong stand in supporting the ICC that characterised Africa’s earlier stance on 
international criminal justice is far less evident today. It is important to investigate why 
this change of heart occurred? What was it that forced the voice of Africa alter its tone? 
It has been suggested that the ICC has developed into a tool of Western powers578 
which is targeting or discriminating against Africa.579 It has been suggested that the 
ICC focus on Africa is restricting rather than assisting African efforts to resolve its 
problems.580 This complaint is often expressed in terms of the Sudan referral.581 On 
October 19 2016, the South African Minister of International Relations and 
                                                          
575 Press Release, United States Department of State, International Criminal Court: Letter to the UN Secretary 
General, Kofi Annan, 6 May 2002, informing that the United States does not intend to become a party to the 
treaty. http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm 
576 US suspends all military aid to South Africa, Cape Times, 2 July 2003. 
577 Agence France Press, 24 July 2003. 
578 Sunday Times 27 July 2008. 
579 Mamdani M, The new humanitarian order, The Nation, 29 September 2008.  
580 Tladi D, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court: The Battle for the Soul of International 
Law,” 61. 
581 The Sudan Referral. UN Security Council SC/8351 31 March 2005. Resolution 1593(2005) The Security 
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Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane gave notice to the UN that it planned to leave 
the ICC.582  The Minister stated, “The Republic of South Africa has found that its 
obligations with respect to the peaceful resolution of conflicts at times are incompatible 
with the interpretation given by the International Court.”583 Other African states, 
through the AU, have called on the UN Security Council to defer the ICC’s investigation 
into President al-Bashir of Sudan by invoking article 16 of the Rome Statute. Another 
objection is that the ICC decided to proceed against a sitting head of state of a country 
that is not party to the Rome Statute. This complaint once again raises the question 
about head of state immunity under customary international law as read with articles 
27 and 98 of the Rome Statute. 
South Africa then progressed through a period of indecision regarding its commitment 
to the ICC. In May 2009, the government confirmed that should President al-Bashir 
attend President Zuma’s inauguration, he would be arrested in terms of the 4 March 
2009 arrest warrant issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC.584 In July 2009 South 
Africa attended an AU meeting in Sirte, Libya, to support a 3 July resolution calling on 
its members to support a resolution to defy the international arrest warrant issued by 
the ICC for the arrest of President al-Bashir. However, only a month previously, the 
South African Minister of Justice, at another AU meeting in Addis Ababa, had joined 
other African states to confirm its commitment to the ICC.585  
Because of its support for the Sirte resolution, South Africa was soon the target of 
severe criticism both at home and abroad. Virtually all of South Africa’s leading human 
rights organisations, including the South African Human Rights Commission, called 
for the South African government to respect its own law and Constitution,586 and 
distance itself from the AU decision to refuse cooperation with the ICC. The General 
                                                          
582 South African diplomats delivered a formal notice of withdrawal from the Rome Statute to the United 
Nations on 19 October 2016. This was the beginning of a year-long process to complete withdrawal. 
583 Mail and Guardian. 21 October 2016. “South Africa begins the process to withdraw from the International 
Criminal Court.” 
584 Sudan Tribune. 9 May 2009. “Sudanese President to skip Zuma’s inauguration.” President Omar al-Bashir 
had been invited to the inauguration of President Zuma in Pretoria, but the Sudanese envoy in Cape Town was 
warned that President al-Bashir would face arrest on arrival in South Africa. 
585 AU meeting in Addis Ababa, 8-9 June 2009. 
586 Sections 231-233 of the Constitution of South Africa 1996. 
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Council of the Bar of South Africa issued a strong statement in which it summed up its 
legal position as follows:587 
“-The issue of whether or not President al-Bashir will be subject to arrest and surrender in South 
Africa should he enter the country, is determined by reference to our laws, including The 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the ICC Act and our Constitution. 
The political considerations that underlie the AU’s concern with the conduct of the ICC and the 
UN Security Council in relation to Africa, should not impede our authorities from performing 
their express legal obligations under our law should al-Bashir enter South Africa.-” 
Following this criticism, on 31 July 2009, the South African government clarified its 
legal obligations in relation to the possible arrest of al-Bashir.588 
In June 2015, President Zuma hosted Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir to an AU 
summit in South Africa and he arrived on Friday 12 June. On the following Saturday, 
20 June 2015, even before a South African court could rule that al-Bashir be arrested, 
an ICC judge, Cuno Tarfusser, issued a decision instructing that South Africa 
immediately arrest and surrender al-Bashir.589 
On Monday, June 15, 2015, the North Gauteng High Court ruled that al-Bashir be 
arrested and handed over to the ICC.590 President al-Bashir was subsequently allowed 
to leave the Waterkloof Military Air Base, despite the court order. 
The Notice of Motion forwarded by the Southern African Litigation Centre on 14 June 
2105 and other High Court decisions will now be discussed in order to confirm various 
interpretations of the Rome Statute and the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002. 
6.3 The application compelling the executive to arrest President Omar al-Bashir 
When President Omar al-Bashir arrived in South Africa on the evening of 13 June 
2015, he was welcomed by South African officials and Sudanese diplomats.591 The 
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government of South Africa took no steps to arrest him, adopting the stance that he 
enjoyed diplomatic immunity. Its failure to arrest President al-Bashir resulted in the 
South African Litigation Centre (SALC), bringing an urgent application on Sunday 14 
June 2015, in the High Court in Pretoria.592 The SALC sought an order declaring the 
failure to take steps to arrest President al-Bashir to be in breach of the Constitution, 
and compel the Government to arrest and surrender President al-Bashir to the ICC. 
The Government opposed the urgent application.593 In granting the postponement the 
High Court  ordered that President Omar al-Bashir was prohibited from leaving the 
Republic of South Africa until a final order was made in the application, and the 
respondents were ordered to ensure all border post were secure and provide proof of 
service of such an order.594 At 1300hrs on Monday 15 June 2015, the High Court 
sought assurance from counsel representing the executive that President al-Bashir 
was still in the country. This assurance was given and at 1500hrs the High Court 
ordered the arrest and surrender of al-Bashir to the ICC. The High Court made the 
following order: 
1. “-That the conduct of the Respondents to the extent that they have failed to take steps to 
arrest and/or detain the President of the Republic of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir (President 
Bashir), is inconsistent with the Constitution595 of the Republic of South Africa, and invalid; 
2. That the respondents are forthwith compelled to take all reasonable steps to prepare to 
arrest President Bashir without a warrant in terms of section 40(1)(k) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and detain him, pending a formal request for his surrender from 
the International Criminal Court; 
3. That the applicant is entitled to the cost of the application on a pro-bono basis.-” 
Immediately after this order was made counsel for the Government informed the High 
Court that President al-Bashir had left South Africa from the Waterkloof Air Force Base 
at about 1130 hrs that morning. The High Court added that the representatives of 
Government set out to mislead the Court in giving instructions, or the representatives 
                                                          
592 Judge Hans Fabricius of the North Gauteng High Court issued a temporary court order barring Sudanese 
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and counsel misled the Court. Whatever was the true explanation, it was disgraceful 
conduct and would be investigated by the appropriate authorities.596  
On appeal,597 the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) considered South Africa’s 
obligations to arrest and surrender a person against whom the ICC had issued an 
arrest warrant.598 The SCA599  carefully reviewed article 27(1) of the Rome Statute 
which states: 
“-This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official 
capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a 
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no way 
exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and itself, 
constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.-” 
 
The SCA found that because Party States (including South Africa) bound themselves 
to the Statute, including this provision, all Party States had waived any immunity that 
their nationals would otherwise have enjoyed under customary international law.600 
The SCA also considered the fact that Sudan was a non-Party State and not bound 
by section 27(1) of the Rome Statute. The Court’s reasoning was that, as non-Party 
States, their nationals are ordinarily brought within the jurisdiction of the ICC by way 
of a UN Security Council reference under Article 13(b). Article 27 is thereby made 
applicable to the non-Party State that is not able to rely on Article 98 of the Rome 
Statute.601 Regarding the relationship between article 98 and article 27 of the Rome 
Statute, South Africa would appear to have taken the position that despite the fact that 
Sudan is not a state party to the Rome Statute, Omar al Bashir does not have an 
entitlement to immunity under article 27 of the Statute.602 
In its reasoning the SCA also referred to the constitutional background to the case. It 
noted that the Constitution makes international customary law part of the law of South 
Africa, but it may be amended by legislation.603 It provides a specific mechanism 
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whereby obligations assumed under international agreements became a part of the 
law of South Africa.604 The SCA referred to Glenister, 605  which emphasised that the 
provisions of our Constitution demonstrate that international law has a special place 
in our law which is carefully defined in the Constitution. The Court pointed out that the 
aim of the ICC Act, noted in the Preamble, was for South Africa to once again become 
an integral and accepted member of the community of nations. 
The SCA noted the ICC’s view that South Africa was not barred by President al-
Bashir’s status as a head of state from arrest and surrender to the ICC.606 The ICC 
believed that immunities granted to President al-Bashir under international law had 
been implicitly waived by the UN Security Council.607 
The SCA quoted an interesting opinion expressed by Dr Weatherall608 “that the State 
is not an abstract entity but a community of human beings. The protection of 
international criminals from international scrutiny under the guise of State dignity, is 
an affront to the citizens against whom grave violations of human rights are 
perpetrated.”609 Similarly in Tachiona v Mugabe610 it was held that resorting to head-
of-state and diplomatic immunity is wearing thinner in the eyes of the world and waning 
in the cover of law. 
The SCA noted that when South Africa decided to implement its obligations under the 
Rome Statute by passing the ICC Act, it did so on the basis that all forms of immunity, 
including head of state immunity, would not constitute a bar to the prosecution of 
international crimes in this country.611 
The SCA dismissed the appeal from the Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and stated that government actions in failing to take steps to arrest and 
detain, for surrender to the ICC, President Omar al-Bashir, was inconsistent with 
                                                          
604 Section 231 of the Constitution of South Africa. 
605 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa & others [2011] ZACC 6; 2011 (3) SA 347. 
606 The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v The Southern African Litigation Centre (867/15) 
[2016] ZASCA 17 (15 March 2016) at [83]. 
607 Special Resolution 1593(2005) of the United Nations Security Council. 
608 Weatherall T, “Jus Cogens and Sovereign Immunity: Reconciling Divergence in Contemporary 
Jurisprudence” (2015) 46 Georgetown Journal of International Law [1175]. 
609 Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v The Southern African Litigation Centre (867/150 
[2016] ZASCA 17 (15 March 2016) at [84]. 
610 Tachiona v Mugabe 169 F Supp 2d 259, 316-7 (SDNY 2001). 
611 The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v The Southern African Litigation Centre (867/15) 
[2016] ZASCA 17 (15 March 2016) at [103]. 
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South Africa’s obligations in terms of the Rome Statute and section 10 of the ICC 
Act, and unlawful.612 
6.4 The manner in which the notice of withdrawal from the ICC was effected 
The matter of Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and 
Cooperation613 was heard before the Gauteng Division of the High Court of South 
Africa (the High Court) on 5 and 6 December 2016 and judgement delivered on 22 
February 2017.  
The matter dealt with an international treaty, The Rome Statute, the ICC Act 27 of 
2002 and notice of withdrawal in terms of article 127(1). Section 231 of the Constitution 
was considered relating to the power of the national executive to negotiate and sign 
an international treaty, and if that power included the authority to withdraw from such 
a treaty without prior parliamentary approval. Another question was whether  
parliamentary approval could be sought after notice of withdrawal had been delivered 
to the UN? 
The High Court noted that the litigation history over the ICC originated with the refusal 
by the South African government to arrest President Omar al-Bashir when he visited 
South Africa in June 2015 and surrender him to the ICC. Subsequently the national 
executive took the decision on 19 October 2016 to withdraw from the ICC. The 
withdrawal process in terms of the Rome Statute614 takes effect 12 months following 
a notice of delivery to the UN.  
On 20 and 21 October 2016, the Minister of Justice informed both the Speaker of the 
National Assembly and the Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) 
of cabinet’s decision and reasons to withdraw from the ICC. The Minister also stated 
his intention to table in parliament a bill repealing the ICC Act.615 
It should be remembered that on 24 October 2016 the Applicant in this case launched 
an application for direct access to the Constitutional Court seeking to challenge the 
executive’s decisions. On 11 November 2016, the Constitutional Court denied direct 
                                                          
612 The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v The Southern African Litigation Centre (867/15) 
[2016] ZASCA 17 (15 March 2016) at [113]. 
613 Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation & others 212 (12) BCLR 1297; 
2013(1) SA248 (CC). 
614 Article 127(1) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
615 The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002. 
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access on the basis that at that stage it was not in the interests of justice to hear the 
matter. 
The Democratic Alliance (DA) constitutional challenge was predicated on the following 
four grounds: 
1. Prior parliamentary approval was required before notice of withdrawal was 
delivered to the UN. (s 231 of the Constitution) 
2. Prior repeal of the ICC Act was required before the notice of withdrawal was 
delivered to the UN. 
3. The delivery of the notice of withdrawal without prior consultation with 
parliament was procedurally irrational. 
4. The withdrawal from the Rome Statute breaches the state’s obligations in terms 
of the Constitution.616 
Once again the High Court referred to Glenister 617 where the Republic’s legal 
obligations under international law were discussed, and the separation of powers 
between the executive and the legislature, particularly the checks and balances 
exercised by both parties. The High Court stated that there was no debate regarding 
the operation of s 231 of the Constitution regarding treaty-making, but noted the 
dispute regarding the withdrawal from an international agreement.618 
The High Court stressed that in terms of s 231 of the Constitution, South Africa had 
both ratified the Rome Statute and domesticated it through the ICC Act.619 While the 
notice of withdrawal was signed and delivered in the conduct of international relations 
and treaty-making as an executive act, it still remained an exercise in public power, 
which must comply with the principle of legality and is subject to constitutional 
control.620 The High Court added that a notice of withdrawal, based on a proper 
construction of s 231(1), is the equivalent of ratification, which requires parliamentary 
approval in terms of s 231(2) of the Constitution.621 
                                                          
616 Section 7(2) of the Constitution of South Africa). 
617 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and others 2011 (3) SA 347; 2011 (7) BCLR 651 (CC) 
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The High Court pointed out that it was indeed correct that in international law, a notice 
of withdrawal from an international agreement does not require parliamentary 
approval.622 However the question of which between the national executive and 
parliament has to decide on, was how withdrawal could be settled according to 
domestic law.623 This is a domestic issue in which international law does not and 
cannot prescribe. Furthermore, parliamentary approval is required before instruments 
of ratification may be deposited with the UN. From this perspective, the court found it 
difficult to accept that the reverse process of withdrawal should not be subject to the 
same parliamentary process.624 
The approval of an international agreement in terms of the Constitution625 creates a 
social contract between the people of South Africa, through their democratically 
elected representatives in the legislature and the national executive. The Court 
indicated that it is trite that where a constitutional provision confers specific powers, 
that provision necessarily confers the power to undo it as well.626 In terms of the Rome 
Statute, the power to bind the country is expressly conferred on parliament. It must 
therefore be parliament which has the power to decide whether an international 
agreement ceases to bind the country.627 
The Court concluded that the absence of a provision in the Constitution of a power for 
the executive628 to terminate international agreements is not a lacuna or omission, but 
a confirmation of the fact that such power does not exist, unless, and until parliament 
legislates for it. The national executive’s decision to deliver notice of withdrawal from 
the ICC to the UN, without prior parliamentary approval in terms of s 231(2) of the 
Constitution, breached the doctrine of separation of powers.629 
                                                          
622 Section 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 56 of the Vienna Convention on 
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624 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and others 2011 (3) SA 347; 2011 (7) BCLR 651 (CC) 
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The Court emphasised the importance of public participation in law making by referring 
to Doctors for Life International.630 This case referred to the participation by the public 
on a continuous basis, which provided vitality to the functioning of representative 
democracy.631 Similarly, it encouraged citizens to become actively involved in public 
affairs and enhance their representative democracy.632 
The question of procedural rationality also received the attention of the Court.633 The 
requirement for rationality is that government action must be rationally connected to a 
legitimate government purpose.634 In Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic 
of South Africa635 the Constitutional Court explained that to determine procedural 
irrationality is to look at the process as a whole and determine whether steps in the 
process were rationally related to the end sought to be achieved.636 
In conclusion the Court stated that the notice of withdrawal from the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, without parliamentary approval was unconstitutional 
and invalid. In addition the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and the 
Minister of Justice and Correctional Services were ordered to revoke the notice of 
withdrawal. Subsequent to this court ruling, on 7 March 2017, the South African 
government issued notice of withdrawal of notification of withdrawal to the UN 
Secretary General Antonio Guterres.637 
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Since the High Court ruling the government has not appealed its decision.  
On 15 March 2017, Justice Minister Michael Masutha formally withdrew South Africa’s 
decision to withdraw from the International Criminal Court. The Speaker in Parliament, 
Baleka Mbete, said in a note in Parliament that Masutha was withdrawing the 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Repeal Bill.638 
6.5 The legal implications and subsequent effects following South Africa’s 
possible withdrawal from the ICC 
 
It is important to analyse the legal position regarding South Africa’s possible 
withdrawal from the ICC, even though at this stage no withdrawal is planned. The legal 
implications that would result are vital to understand the constitutional provisions 
contained in sections 232 and 233 of the Constitution, read with corresponding 
responsibilities contained in Article 127(2) of the Rome Statute. 
Withdrawal from the Rome Statute takes effect one year after the date of receipt of a 
withdrawal notification.639 Until such time, a party remains bound by its obligation 
under this international agreement. 
A legal implication of South African withdrawal from the ICC is that it will still have to 
comply with Article 127(2) of the Rome Statute which states: 
“-Withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the Court in connection with criminal 
investigations and proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing State had a duty to 
cooperate and which were commenced prior to the date on which the withdrawal became 
effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter which 
was already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the withdrawal 
became effective.-” 
South Africa was a member of the ICC when the arrest warrants were issued against 
President Omar al-Bashir on 4 March 2009 and 12 July 2010.640 No thought had been 
directed at a withdrawal from the ICC at that time. South Africa was duty bound in 
terms of the ICC Act to arrest President al-Bashir when he visited South Africa in June 
                                                          
judgement, I hereby revoke the Instrument of Withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International 
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639 Article 127(1) of The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
640 ICC Warrant of Arrest ICC-02/05-01/09-1 Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir 4 March 2009. Second Warrant of 
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2015. South Africa failed to arrest him and thus may face an international charge under 
the Rome Statute.641 Indeed, South African authorities have appeared at the 
International Criminal Court on 7 April 2017, to explain the country’s failure to arrest 
President al-Bashir in June 2015.642 South Africa will appear before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber of the ICC to argue why the Court should not make a finding of non-
compliance against South Africa. In addition the ICC has decided to hold a public 
hearing, under the provisions of the Rome Statute643 to determine whether to find 
South Africa guilty of non-compliance. The Rome Statute in Article 87(7) invites the 
ICC to refer a non-cooperating state to the UN Security Council or the Assembly of 
State Parties. It is submitted the ICC, in the light of the existing convincing judicial 
processes and evidence, will find South Africa a non-cooperating State Party. This 
would be a highly embarrassing event for South Africa, given its extensive previous 
cooperation in the initial development of the ICC.644 
Should South Africa withdraw from the ICC it would have a considerable impact on the 
domestic enforcement of international criminal law. The ICC Act645 establishes 
domestic procedures for cooperation with the ICC646 and would be meaningless 
without ICC membership. The ICC Act would have to be repealed or amended should 
South Africa’s withdrawal proceed, supported now by an appropriate parliamentary 
process. 
The ICC Act established domestic crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, asserting universal jurisdiction over these crimes.647 If the ICC Act is 
repealed, then no such jurisdiction will in future exist in South Africa. This would have 
a considerable effect on the international network of international criminal law.648 In 
the Constitutional Court in National Commissioner of the South African Police Service 
v Southern African Litigation Centre649 the Court held that the ICC Act imposed an 
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obligation on domestic authorities to investigate international crimes committed 
outside of South Africa. 
Another legal implication of a possible South African withdrawal from the ICC, is that 
it may lead to accelerated ratification by AU Member States of the expansion of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights jurisdiction, to include international 
crimes.650 This could, in turn, accelerate further withdrawal from the ICC by AU 
Member States.  
In February 2009 the AU Assembly decided to request the AU Commission to assess 
the implications of establishing an African Court to try international crimes, such as 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.651 
The establishment of an African Criminal Court (ACC) as a substitute for ICC 
membership, as suggested by the AU, including South Africa, has significant 
challenges.652  It would not have jurisdiction over serving heads of state or “senior 
state officials.” This is contained in the Malabo Court Protocol653 which states: 
“-No charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court against any serving AU Head 
of State or Government, or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior 
state officials based on their functions, during their tenure of office.-”  
Whatever the merits of an African-based court on criminal justice may be, it will be 
viewed with scepticism due to the conflict between this clause and the Rome Statute 
of the ICC. The corresponding section in the Rome Statute of the ICC654 provides that 
“official capacity” as head of state or senior state official shall in no case exempt a 
person from criminal responsibility. The jurisdiction of this Court will only commence 
in respect of actions committed after its establishment. Consequently President Omar 
al-Bashir would have nothing to fear from this court. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
While South African courts can still preside over cases involving international criminal 
justice, a subsequent Repeal Bill655 of the ICC Act would cast a dark shadow over 
South African commitment to ending global human rights concerns. The Repeal Bill 
Preamble is concerning in that it recognises diplomatic immunity of heads of state “in 
order to effectively promote dialogue and the peaceful resolution of conflicts wherever 
they may occur, but particularly on the African continent.”656 Bearing in mind that most 
conflicts in Africa have been initiated by heads of state, it is difficult to understand the 
content and logic of the Repeal Bill. In addition to the repeal of the ICC Act, certain 
sections of the South African Red Cross Society and Legal Protection of Emblems 
Act657 and Geneva Conventions Act658 have been repealed, because of their 
relationship and dependence on the ICC Act. 
Finally, it is submitted that the withdrawal of South Africa from the ICC and possible 
repeal of the ICC Act, may jeopardise or undermine South Africa’s mandated ability to 
act against international crimes that may occur domestically, including racial 
discrimination and xenophobia which are becoming increasingly apparent. 
 
Chapter 7 CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has investigated the historical development of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, South Africa’s involvement in its formation, and a 
critical appraisal of the legal implications of South Africa’s possible withdrawal from 
the ICC. 
Since 1994, South Africa is now party to several human rights instruments, which have 
been incorporated in the Bill of Rights within the Constitution. As a result the 
application of international human rights law is evident in domestic case law, where 
international agreements and customary international human rights law has provided 
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a framework for the application of the Bill of Rights. It would appear that international 
law is mainly directed at states and not in the promotion of the welfare of individuals. 
The Second World War and the resulting military tribunals, provided the impetus for 
the creation of a permanent international criminal court. These military tribunals 
created new standards of international law. The atrocities in Yugoslavia in the early 
1990s strengthened the momentum for the development of an International Criminal 
Court (ICC). During the formation of the Rome Statute, South Africa took up important 
positions on human rights which were noted by international jurists. The ICC was 
created with the extensive involvement of African nations and subsequently provided 
leading African jurists the opportunity to function within its structures. President 
Mandela encouraged South Africa’s involvement in the ICC, in order to once again 
become an integral and accepted member of the community of nations. 
Membership of the ICC has cemented South Africa’s national commitment to human 
rights, which has been facilitated by the involvement of prominent national leaders and 
jurists. Leaving the ICC would tarnish South Africa’s reputation and intent to be known 
as a domestic beacon in Africa, focussed on its international obligation to human rights 
and justice. The intent to withdraw from the ICC used the President Omar al-Bashir 
incident as a convenient excuse, as senior government leaders and officials fear future 
prosecution for human rights abuses from the ICC. 
Prior to the passing of the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Act in 2002, South Africa had no domestic legislation pertaining to war 
crimes or crimes against humanity. The ICC Act provides South African courts with 
extended jurisdiction to deal with crimes committed outside the territory of the 
Republic. The Preamble to the ICC Act records that South Africa has an international 
obligation under the Rome Statute to bring the perpetrators of crimes against humanity 
to justice. An important element of the ICC Act is that there is no defence to an ICC 
defined crime by virtue of being a head of state or member of government. Public 
opinion now dictates that Head of State and diplomatic immunity is wearing thin in the 
eyes of the world. 
The UN Security Council is central to the story of the confrontational relationship that 
exists between the African Union and the UN. This was exacerbated by the two arrest 
warrants issued against President Omar al-Bashir and the Security Council’s power to 
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defer proceedings against al-Bashir under article 16 of the UN Statute. The arrest 
warrant for al-Bashir has resulted that the ICC being perceived as a Western institution 
and should not exercise jurisdiction over African leaders. 
The South African government’s argument that it is not obliged to hand over an 
individual to the ICC, because in so doing it would be inconsistent with its obligation 
under international law. This is with respect to state or diplomatic immunity, which 
completely ignores the spirit and intent of article 27 of the ICC Act. The Chief Justice 
of South Africa, Mogoeng Mogoeng, remembering the words of Nelson Mandela, 
stressed that Africa and the world needed the ICC yesterday, today and forever. 
The South African Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), stated that failing to arrest 
President Omar al-Bashir was inconsistent with South Africa’s obligations in terms of 
the Rome Statute and the ICC Act. In addition the SCA ruled that notice of withdrawal 
from the ICC required parliamentary approval which was not provided prior to notifying 
the UN of intent to withdraw from the ICC. 
Should the ICC Act be repealed, no jurisdiction would be in place for crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and genocide. This would have a negative effect on the 
international network of criminal law, including the domestic application of the Act, 
where racial discrimination and acts of xenophobia are becoming increasingly 
apparent.  
The ICC Act and South Africa’s continued membership of the ICC underpin the new 
constitutional values that support South African society. The South African courts 
understand these values in the context of both international and domestic human 
rights obligations. It is indeed fortunate that the South African Chief Justice can provide 
clear direction and guidance for our membership of the ICC yesterday, today and 
forever.  
The character and reputation of the South African government depends on the 
consistency of their actions. How the country is perceived abroad depends on 
congruence between the words and actions of government. The inconsistency of 
government’s actions regarding our membership of the ICC has diminished the 
character and credibility of our nation which is manifest by internal violence, corruption 
and intolerance. 
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Only continued membership of the ICC, consistent government action and the respect 
of human rights, will drive South Africa back onto the rails of credibility and prosperity. 
We shall see. 
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